The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

20.9
20.10
of Delegation (LOD) are issued);
Use of Recognised Standards (by application of Defence Standard 00-970);
Independent Assessment (by the use of independent and competent Third Parties); and
Chapter 20 – New Principles
Safety Management System (by ‘cradle to grave’ safety management including feedback).
These are all admirable aims and aspirations in themselves; and they represent key steps in any safety journey. As
Chapters 10 and 11 have shown, however, statements of good practice counted for little during the drawing
up of the Nimrod Safety Case. As Chapter 13 has shown, these pillars were vulnerable to being obscured or
diminished or re-arranged by the powerful organisational forces prevalent at the time. And as Chapter 19
explains, there is much that has gone wrong with the Airworthiness Management system in the MOD in the
past decade to put it in its current, weakened state.
In order to make good such aims and aspirations regarding Airworthiness, it is necessary to identify, and adhere
to, the correct overriding principles which are most likely to drive the behaviours necessary to ensure the
required steps are taken and the right Safety Culture is established. Currently, a sense of clearly identified
overriding principles in the arena of MOD Airworthiness is lacking. In order to re-build Airworthiness and restore
confidence in the MOD, it is necessary to identify some core principles and to stick to them throughout the
process of designing, establishing and operating any new Airworthiness Management System in the future.
Discussions in the context of ‘Process Safety’ Management
20.11
There are many well-known principles in the ‘safety’ field from which to choose. They tend to coalesce around
some common themes. 7 In the context of ‘Process Safety’, which is the term used to describe the blend of
general management and engineering skills aimed at preventing catastrophic accidents, particularly explosions,
fires and toxic releases, 8 the Health & Safety Executive recommends that major hazard organisations should
focus on ‘Process Safety leadership’ built around seven key elements: 9
(1) Leadership.
(2) Process management taking place at all business levels.
(3) Real and dynamic risk assessments.
(4) Robust management of change approaches.
(5) Sustainability.
(6) Well trained and competent people.
(7) A learning organisation.
7 e.g. ‘Leadership’, ‘Communication’, ‘Audit’, etc.
8 A ‘Process Safety Management’ regulation was promulgated by the U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) in the wake of the
Bhopal Disaster.
9 I had the benefit of being invited to attend a seminal conference organised by the Health & Safety Executive entitled “Leading from the Top –
Avoiding Major Incidents”, London, 29 April 2008.
489