The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Formidable quadruple challenge faced by IPTs
13.88
Safety regime
13.89
13.90
Chapter 13 – Cuts, Change, Dilution and Distraction (1998-2006)
Thus, platform IPTs within the DLO, including the Nimrod IPT, were being expected to face the formidable,
quadruple challenge of: (i) coping with major organisational change; (ii) seeking to maintain or improve the
availability of equipment to the three Armed Services; (iii) dealing with increasing operational demands and
UORs; whilst at the same time (iv) dealing with the imperative of delivering three layers of substantial yearon-year
financial cuts, reductions in output costs and efficiencies.
This was accompanied by a loosening rather than a tightening of the safety and airworthiness regime (see
Dilution of Airworthiness Regime below). It is noteworthy that, in his Foreward to the DLO Environment
& Safety Report 2002, Sir Sam Cowan had to report a “challenging” year for the DLO safety community
“with resources under considerable pressure” in some business units. The Director Safety, Estates & Security
reported that “a recurrent theme is the challenge posed by an ever decreasing pool of suitably qualified and
experienced personnel and, of course, the constraints imposed by limited resources”.
In all the circumstances, it is not surprising that something subsequently gave way.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger (CDL 2002- 2004).
13.91
Task
Air Chief Marshal Pledger replaced Sir Sam Cowan as CDL on 2 September 2002, a post which he held until
31 December 2004. His tenure as CDL, therefore, coincided with the key period of the drawing up of the
Nimrod Safety Case (see Chapters 10A and 10B).
13.92 Sir Malcolm Pledger said in his evidence to the Review about his appointment: “I was tasked with transforming
the acquisition and through-life logistics support for the Armed Forces and delivering efficiencies equivalent
to 20% of the £10 billion top level budget”. When questioned, he explained that he had not been specifically
tasked in so many words, but this was his interpretation of his role following his introductory meetings with
the then Secretary of State and Ministers and others (see also further below).
Poisoned chalice
13.93
It is fair to say that that Sir Malcolm Pledger inherited a situation which was not of his making and, to some
extent, was handed a poisoned chalice.
(1) Change programme ‘stalled’
13.94 First, the DLO’s ‘Business Change’ programme had “stalled” due to what McKinsey said were “fundamental
questions about affordability, delivery, prioritisation and focus on core business drivers”. 36 It was clearly
proving difficult to deliver the 20% reduction in output costs in the timescales required by the Strategic Goal
as well as coping with the 900 ‘Change’ initiatives. When Sir Malcolm Pledger took over as CDL in September
2003, the DLO had delivered only 5.6% of the 20% Strategic Goal and 14.4% remained to be achieved by
2005/06, i.e. only about a quarter of the Goal had been met with nearly half the time gone. As he said, “the
programme that I inherited had significant financial risk embedded within it”. He would have to accelerate
the programme and catch up if he was to achieve the Goal. He said that the 20% Strategic Goal figure gave
him a ‘concern’ when he took over because “I had no idea personally at the time whether or not what we
held was sufficient to perform the operation that we were due to be embarked upon [namely, Iraq]” and this
kind of financial risk meant his ability to ‘mend’ aspects would be very restricted.
36 McKinsey’s its paper, Re-energising the DLO Change Programme, paragraph 2.1.
377