The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
10A.167
10A.168
226
Following the meeting, Witness K [BAE Systems] wrote a personal note to himself which showed his
frustration:
“[Witness K] Note (Personal)
Seemed pointless to contest the end of week completion date as all know % complete is
stated as 68% and we’ve been on the job for over 4 months and at best completing end
date by end Aug-mid Sept. Also no metrics to size each of remaining tasks has been done.
So no-one around the table had an est. of hours to completion, only hours remaining.
No accurate estimate; no rate of completion figure; no calculated end date therefore no
chance of an accurate forecasted completion date, obvious end of week crap but one
guess I suppose is all that’s req’d. CL & RO: Sat end of week is sched finish. I suppose
that we’re 2/3/4 weeks behind approach will be used in the forth-coming weeks. TTRO
planning at its best!!!!!”
Witness K [BAE Systems] shared his concerns with his line manager, Eric Prince.
Electrical Systems merely add ‘addendum’ to completed Mech Systems Pro-Formas
10A.169 In order to speed up the Electrical Systems response, on 16 August 2004, a change of approach was adopted.
Rather than producing their own separate ‘stand alone’ Pro-Formas, it was decided that Electrical Systems
would simply add an addendum to Mech Systems’ Pro-Formas where Electrical Systems’ input was required.
This was plainly cutting corners. As will be seen, the quality of analysis by Electrical Systems deteriorated
markedly as time ran short. On 17 August 2004 alone, Witness T [BAE Systems] sent by e-mail three Electrical
Systems ‘addenda’ to Mech Systems for incorporation. An increasing number of addenda completed by
Witness T [BAE Systems] in the latter half of August simply contained the phrase, “Further analytical techniques
are considered necessary in order to categorise the risk…”. The reason for this was quite simply that Witness
T [BAE Systems] ran out of time to conduct the necessary analysis, as various witnesses such as Witness C
[BAE Systems] confirmed. The effect of this rider was that hazards which had been classified as ‘Improbable’
or ‘Remote’ by Mech Systems became ‘Unclassified’. This was also unsatisfactory, as I discuss in more detail
in Chapter 11.
23 August 2004: Mech Systems Pro-forma for Hazard H73 finalised and approved
10A.170 The next two weeks involved a period of frantic activity, particularly in Mech Systems and Electrical Systems,
processing Pro-Formas. It fell to Witness R [BAE Systems], who had been seconded to Mech Systems, to draw
up the crucial Mech Systems Zonal Hazard Analysis Pro-Forma for zones 514/614 relating to the No. 7 Tank
Dry Bays (port and starboard) and the risks associated with the Cross-Feed/SCP duct. This was known as zonal
Hazard H73. Witness R [BAE Systems] finalised and signed the Mech Systems Pro-Forma for Hazard H73 on
23 August 2004. Eric Prince added his signature on the same day against the legend “Contents Approved”.
10A.171 Zonal Hazard H73 represented the rationalisation and combining of two zonal hazards, Hazard H367 and
Hazard H498: