The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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CAS
4-Star
CE (RAF)
3-Star
DGSM
2-Star
Heads of EEngineering
Aut thority
1-Star
Commannding
MDG Grouups
Chapter 13 – Cuts, Change, Dilution and Distraction (1998-2006)
SofS
Defence
NAVY V
ARMY
Figure 13.4: Chain of delegation for airworthiness in 1990s
The CE(RAF), therefore, had a powerful voice as regards airworthiness which resonated through the
organisation.
Air Chief Marshals Sir Michael Alcock and Air Marshal Sir Colin Terry
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In my view, the post CE(RAF) was a key feature of the strong airworthiness regime and culture which existed
in 1990s. This was due in no small measure to the high calibre and leadership of those who held that post
in the heydays of RAF Logistics Command, in particular Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Alcock (1994-1996)
and Air Marshal Sir Colin Terry (1997-1999). They commanded great respect and esteem: (a) because of
their knowledge of the subject (they were both distinguished aviation engineers); (b) because they insisted
on high standards and brought great rigour to bear; and (c) because they took a keen, personal interest
in all airworthiness issues (and used the “long screwdriver” with great effect). They inculcated a strong
airworthiness and ‘questioning’ culture at RAF Logistics Command which probably represents the ‘golden
period’ for airworthiness in recent years. Many witnesses attested to this view.
CE(RAF)’s Audit team
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The CE(RAF) and DGSM had an airworthiness audit team comprising a Wing Commander and four Squadron
Leaders who were permanently engaged in visiting MDGs and auditing their airworthiness processes. This was
achieved by both following a structured examination of internal MDG processes and activity, and sampling
actual activity and decision-making. This system of regular auditing was very effective for two reasons. First,
as one witness put it, the allocation of significant manpower resources directly to auditing “allowed you to
do a lot of digging” and kept people on their toes. Second, there was no doubt about the airworthiness
chain of responsibility: the delegation of airworthiness authority flowed down from DGSM to the MDGs. It
was the DGSM himself who owned the audit team. The audit team reported back direct to him about what
they found at the MDGs. It was, therefore, “a very tight closed loop” between the man who was delegating
authority and the audit team who were responsible to him.
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