The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
QinetiQ’s real role
11.274 In its written evidence to the Review, QinetiQ sought to contend that its role in relation to the NSC was
limited “to occasionally being called upon to provide advice in relation [sic] the process and methodology to
be used, and used, for the purposes of the completion of the BLSC and Hazard Log”. It is my view, however,
that this does not reflect the full picture. Although never formally appointed as ISA, it is clear that QinetiQ
was nevertheless tasked and retained by the Nimrod IPT to act as its ‘independent advisor’ throughout the
development of the NSC, and QinetiQ accepted that role (see the Tasking Forms 2002-2006 for QinetiQ Task
No. 10, pursuant to which QinetiQ was tasked to “provide advice and assistance to the Nimrod IPT on matters
concerning Safety Management Systems”). During the period 2002 to 2006, QinetiQ was regarded as, and
did in fact assume the role of, independent advisor in this regard and gave regular advice to the Nimrod IPT in
relation to the development of the NSC. QinetiQ representatives attended all the relevant meetings at which
the NSC was discussed during the period 2002-2005 (namely all the PSWG meetings, all the QinetiQ Task
Review meetings, the Scoping meeting on 19 May 2003, the Progress Review meeting on 17 June 2004, and
the Customer Acceptance Conference on 31 August – 1 September 2004). Moreover, and as indicated by the
detailed account of those meetings in Chapter 10A, on most occasions (with the notable exceptions of the
Customer Acceptance Conference and Sixth PSWG), QinetiQ actively participated in those meetings, engaging
in substantive discussions as to the methodology and content of the NSC, and advising the Nimrod IPT in respect
thereof (see especially the meetings of 19 May 2003 and 17 June 2004, discussed in Chapter 10A). During the
period 2002 to 2006, QinetiQ charged £30,528.00 for its services as ‘independent advisor’ to the Nimrod IPT in
relation to its Safety Management Systems including the NSC.
11.275 In the circumstances, I am in no doubt that QinetiQ’s role was not merely ad hoc but QinetiQ was properly
regarded as, and assumed the role of, the Nimrod IPT’s ‘independent advisor’ in relation to the NSC project.
Accordingly, in my view, during the gestation of the NSC, QinetiQ had three main duties to perform: (a) actively
to consider, question and advise the Nimrod IPT whether it was “satisfied with the work done so far and the
approach taken” by BAE Systems; 135 (b) to speak out and warn the Nimrod IPT whenever significant issues of
concern regarding the NSC came to its attention; and (c) to satisfy itself that it was appropriate for the Nimrod
IPT to sign off the final BLSC deliverable reports. I explain below how, in my judgment, QinetiQ failed properly
to fulfil these duties.
Summary of criticisms of QinetiQ
11.276 In my judgement, the following criticisms of QinetiQ regarding its role as ‘independent advisor’ in relation to the
NSC during the period 2002 to 2005 are borne out:
324
(1) QinetiQ failed to take adequate steps to formalise its appointment as ISA or otherwise clarify
the nature of its role.
(2) QinetiQ failed to check that BAE Systems sentenced risks in an appropriate manner, i.e. using
appropriate data.
(3) QinetiQ failed to check that BAE Systems included risk mitigation evidence in the BLSC
Reports.
(4) QinetiQ failed to advise the Nimrod IPT properly at the Customer Acceptance Conference,
failed to ask intelligent questions, and succumbed to pressure to be party to a ‘consensus’
that BAE Systems had completed the NSC task.
(5) QinetiQ failed to read the NSC reports or otherwise check BAE Systems’ work.
(6) QinetiQ failed to advise the Nimrod IPT properly at the Sixth Platform Safety Working Group
meeting or ask any intelligent questions.
(7) QinetiQ subsequently supported the ‘sign off’ of BAE Systems’ NSC reports in circumstances
where it was manifestly inappropriate to do so: (a) without even having read any of them and
(b) in the absence of an ISA audit report, contrary to Def-Stan 00-56.
135 This formulation is taken from Martyn Mahy’s e-mail to Frank Walsh dated 21 May 2004 following a visit to BAE Systems Chadderton.