The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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apex, was lost. In December 2002, Advantage Technical Consulting made the following recommendation:
“There is a pressing need to bring greater harmony and consistency to the assurance of equipment safety.
This will best be prosecuted by the appointment of a 2* champion empowered by the DESB.” 58 This was
unfortunately not taken up. The creation of a multi-faceted project-based organisation made the retention of
a single, acknowledged point of responsibility for safety and airworthiness all the more important.
I welcome the decision by the PUS, Sir Bill Jeffrey, and current CDM, General Sir Kevin O’Donoghue, to create
the post of Defence Chief Airworthiness Engineer within his organisation in an effort to create the focus for
the MOD that was once provided for the RAF by CE(RAF). However, welcome though this initiative is, I believe
that there is a need to go considerably further and I make detailed recommendations regarding the future
role, duties and position of a CE(RAF) in Part VI of this Report.
(2) Demise of full Airworthiness Audits and Support Authority Reviews
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With the demise of the role of CE(RAF), there were fewer full Airworthiness Audits and the rigorous
airworthiness review process known as “Support Authority Reviews” which had been conducted on a regular
basis in the days of Logistics Command disappeared.
There was a perception in some quarters that such Airworthiness Audits were ‘something of an imposition’
and not ‘adding value’ and that to get rid of them would save money. They did not properly reappear again
until late 2005, when they were re-started by an AD EngPol (who obtained agreement that that they could
take place at the same time as Defence Equipment Safety Group (DESG) audits covering generic equipment
safety, health and safety aspects, and environmental aspects). There were audits of IPTs during the period 2000
to 2005. These tended, however, to focus on process and procedure. These initially comprised ‘compliance
audits’ conducted to ensure that IPT staffs were ‘following local procedures’ and ‘surveys’ to check the
implementation of Safety Management Procedures; and subsequently included ‘second party audits’ of IPT
safety management activities which were introduced under the aegis of AD EngPol AW&SHEF. 59 IPTs were
also required to report to the Fixed Wing Airworthiness Management Group (FWAMG) on a regular basis
using the airworthiness ‘Scorecard’ method.
13.151 In the days of the CE(RAF), periodic airworthiness reviews, known as “Support Authority Reviews”, were
conducted of each aircraft type. These were penetrating, rigorous and highly effective. They were conducted
in a formal manner in accordance with the then applicable regulations. 60 They were chaired by the CE(RAF)
himself. They brought together senior engineering expertise which brought scrutiny to bear. Senior officers in
charge of each aircraft type were obliged to make presentations justifying the airworthiness of their aircraft.
These were formal ‘set piece’ meetings in which the CE(RAF) himself played an active role cross-questioning.
The presence of the CE(RAF) gave “a very immediate incentive” for such presentations to be prepared with
great care. They normally were. These meetings were pieces of “grand theatre”, as Sir Sam Cowan put it in
his oral evidence to the Review, with “a huge gap between the 4-Star 3-Star officer and the poor chap who
is marched in to give an account”. But that was the point. Everyone recognised that they had to be on their
mettle and weaknesses in the airworthiness case would be exposed. The “Support Authority Reviews” had
the salutary effect of putting airworthiness at the top of the agenda and keeping it there in everyone’s minds.
As one former AD(Eng)Pol put it: “You knew you had to be on top of your airworthiness game. You would
get skinned alive if you were not and did not know exactly what was happening to your fleet.”
(3) Downgrading of level at which FWAMG chaired
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There was a steady downgrading of the level at which the Fixed Wing Airworthiness Management Group
(FWAMG) was chaired.
In June 1987, the then CE(RAF), Sir Colin Terry, formed the FWAMG as a specific ‘airworthiness’ forum. Its
terms of reference were “to monitor, co-ordinate and report on all aspects of equipment airworthiness/ safety
relating to MOD fixed-wing aircraft” and to report every six months to the Defence Aviation Safety Board61 58 “Safety Process Review”, dated 23 December 2002, Advantage Technical Consulting, Summary, paragraph 10.
59 See the Report of AD EngPol on Air Equipment Safety in DLO E&S Report 2003, page 20.
60 AP100A-01, Leaflet 170 and Business Procedure E1970.
61 Predecessor of the MOD Aviation and Regulatory Safety Board (MARSB).