The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
Conclusion on MOD airworthiness regime
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Fig. 13.7: Present MOD Regulatory Structure
During the period 1998 to date, the MOD airworthiness regime suffered from an inexorable descent into
the vortex of ever-increasing complexity and confusion. This was due first to the difficulties of constructing
and maintaining a simple and coherent safety and airworthiness regime against a backdrop of continuous
organisational change; and second to a predeliction in the MOD for complexity as opposed to simplicity. The
MOD is not alone in this regard. The instinctive reaction of many governmental organisations to problems
is the creation of more complexity, not less, and the ‘bolting-on’ of more process, procedures, boards,
committees, working parties, etc. rather than stripping away the excess and getting down to the essential
elements. The net result for the MOD was, unfortunately, an increasingly complicated safety and airworthiness
system which was accompanied by a significant weakening of airworthiness oversight and culture during
the period leading up to the loss of XV230 in September 2006. Over the past decade, responsibility for
risk and risk management has been divided, dissipated and dispersed. Risk has effectively been ‘orphaned’
by being made part of an extended family, with everyone involved but no-one responsible. (See further
Chapter 19).
Dilution of airworthiness regime
13.140
The period 2000-2005 saw an unfortunate dismantling of some of the key features of the safety and
airworthiness regime which had existed in the 1990s. The effect was to undermine further the safety and
airworthiness culture and oversight in the MOD.
AESOP Working Group in 2000 and DASB
13.141
A review of the MOD’s environmental and safety structures was carried out in 1999 following the launch of
the SDR initiative and the formation of the DLO. The review was carried out by a working group of interested
parties, known as the AESOP51 Working Group (AESOP WG). Surprisingly, the AESOP WG did not include
any representative from the AOA or the RTSA. Whilst Eng Pol and ADRP were represented (i.e. airworthiness
policy and acquisition), the representation was only at a low level. It is therefore fair to say that there was no,
or at least very little, meaningful airworthiness input into the AESOP study.
51 All-Embracing Safety Organisation Post-SDR.