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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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10A.51<br />

Chapter 10A – <strong>Nimrod</strong> Safety Case: <strong>The</strong> Facts (Phases 1 and 2)<br />

Although a Fault Tree for Uncontrolled Fire/Explosion was included in Annex A, owing to the multitude of<br />

causes of fire and explosion throughout the aircraft, it was agreed at the workshop that expanding the<br />

Fault Tree below the top level fire and explosion events would not be effective or productive. Instead, it was<br />

decided to address the fire hazard by using the alternative ZHA approach. After this ZHA exercise had been<br />

undertaken, a more detailed fault tree for Uncontrolled Fire was drawn up in the interests of completeness.<br />

This Fault Tree listed the general areas in which an “Uncontrolled Fire” might occur, including the fuselage,<br />

wings, empennage, APU bay and landing gear bays, and analysed the various ways in which the three<br />

necessary ingredients (ignition + fuel + oxygen) might combine in e.g. the Wing Dry Bays:<br />

10A.52 <strong>The</strong> FTA was the only piece of analysis in the entire NSC process that was carried out jointly, i.e. with<br />

participation by BAE Systems and <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT personnel (which included a former <strong>Nimrod</strong> pilot). It benefitted<br />

from this operator input.<br />

25 September 2002: <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT formally authorises BAE Systems to proceed with Phase 1<br />

10A.53<br />

On 25 September 2002, the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT authorised BAE Systems to go ahead and produce Phase 1 of the<br />

NSC for the price quoted. BAE Systems was tasked by the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT and undertook to produce a Safety<br />

Case for the <strong>Nimrod</strong> MR2 and R1 to achieve compliance with JSP318B (Edition 4). 42 <strong>The</strong> start date for Phase<br />

1 was November 2002 and the finish date was initially 14 March 2003, but subsequently slipped to 18 April<br />

2003.<br />

December 2002 and March 2003: BAE Systems’ zonal inspection visits<br />

10A.54<br />

Zonal inspections were carried out by BAE Systems’ personnel at RAF Waddington between 10 and 12<br />

December 2002 and at RAF Kinloss between 11 and 12 March 2003. At RAF Waddington two <strong>Nimrod</strong> R1<br />

aircraft were inspected: XV249 undergoing a Minor service and XW664 undergoing a modification. At RAF<br />

Kinloss three MR2 aircraft were inspected in different states: XV248 on the flight line; XV227 undergoing<br />

Minor maintenance; and XV236 undergoing Major maintenance and therefore in a stripped down condition.<br />

Given the scale of the task, these zonal inspection visits were short. (It should be noted that the zonal<br />

inspection visit to RAF Kinloss in 2008 for the review of the NSC lasted much longer but only involved 11<br />

zones.)<br />

42 PDS Task 16 3151) BAE Task No. 26-3244 – <strong>Nimrod</strong> Baseline Safety Case (Phase 1), dated 4 September 2002.<br />

201

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