The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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Chapter 21 – New Military Airworthiness Regime
For the avoidance of doubt, for Recommendation 22.D.2: (1) This is an additional role for the Regulator, but
an important one, which might have may have had a bearing on, for example, the loss of Nimrod XV230, had
such a system been in place; and (2) It will only be possible for the Regulator to provide independent analysis
if a standard format is used to record data for all of the IPTs.
Recommendation 21.D.3: A pan-Defence reporting system shall be established as part of the regulatory
framework, which shall include HF, MEMS and MOR, with the MAA acting as the higher authority for
mandatory reporting and with the Operating Centre Directors and AOAs responsible for assimilation,
analysis and for directing action.
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For the avoidance of doubt, for Recommendation 21.D.3: (1) Given that the current reporting systems have
evolved from differing organisations, driven by differing requirements, the Regulator will need: (a) to conduct
a review to look at the coherence and relevance of the different systems and to ensure they achieve their
intended aim; (b) to conduct a process of alignment to iron out inconsistencies across the three Services and
to establish a more effective and coherent reporting system; and (c) to look across the areas of Airspace
Management, Flight Operations and Airworthiness; and (2) Making the Regulator the higher authority for
mandatory reporting will ensure that reports are sent to specific addressees for action (Operation Centre
Directors and AOAs), providing the Regulator with essential oversight of Airworthiness trends and issues
which may affect policy and regulation as a consequence, with the added benefit of independent assessment.
As this will be a new function for the Regulator, appropriate resources will need to be found to enable the
Regulator to carry it out.
Recommendation D.4: In order to ensure that HF (M)EMS has the opportunity to realise its full potential
for Defence:
Recommendation 21.D.4.1: There shall be an adequately resourced single dedicated IPT created to
implement a project of this scale across four different TLBs.
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For the avoidance of doubt, for Recommendation 21.D.4.1: (1) The IPT will need specialist training in HF (M)
EMS; (2) Continuity of these key posts is critical during the implementation programme; and (3) Without a
dedicated team, the programme implementation is no longer manageable at SO1 level, particularly with the
increased interest across the four TLBs.
Recommendation 21.D.4.2: There shall be a coherent Single Implementation Programme across all four
TLBs.
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21.89
For the avoidance of doubt, for Recommendation 21.D.4.2: (1) There are clear advantages of developing
a single implementation programme which could accommodate the specific needs of each Service but yet
which maintains an overall coherent and consistent approach. At present, Air Command and DE&S are
contracted separately with Baines Simmons; and (2) If Fleet and Land (Joint Helicopter Command) were also
to contract independently, each programme would effectively be competing for Baines Simmons resources
and in an uncoordinated way. Indeed, under MOD commercial competitive arrangements, this might be a
difficult contract to let to Baines Simmons alone.
Recommendation 21.D.4.3: The Implementation Programme shall be properly resourced.
For the avoidance of doubt, for Recommendation 21.D.4.3: (1) The results of the EMDs show that baseline
level of HF training within the RAF engineering community is inconsistent. Therefore, to implement HF (M)
EMS properly, it is necessary to train a combined module of HF followed by (M)EMS; and (2) The Business Case
for (M)EMS assumed a basic HF knowledge and was mainly costed against (M)EMS training. Accordingly, in
order to realise the full potential of HF (M)EMS, the Business Case shall be expanded to include baseline HF
training.
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