The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
476
by the IPT and has refused to let their people fly in those aircraft. This fundamentally undermines the basic
construct of the scheme which is for an ‘approved’ organisation, such as an IPT, to issue ‘approved’ data.
Regulator-issued MAOS approvals are based on evidence that processes exist rather than the effectiveness
of their processes or the output standard of the aircraft post-Depth maintenance. Further, under the MAOS
arrangements, the IPTs act as the Continued Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO) and the IPT
Leader (IPTL) is the Continued Airworthiness Manager (CAM). The IPTs and the IPTL are thus the type-specific
Regulator, the Engineering Authority, and the Airworthiness Authority, with control over in-year finance and
support contracts. This is a range of roles that would be deemed unacceptable for one organisation to hold
in civil aviation.
(14) The MOD Regulators lack oversight of Airworthiness management at the Front-Line.
19.18
9 Unlike EASA and the CAA who govern civil aviation, the MOD’s Regulators lack direct authority over the
operating authorities (AOAs). The MOD Regulators are also dispersed both functionally and geographically.
Crucially, they have very little oversight of Airworthiness management where it most matters, i.e. at the point
of use.
(15) There is no training in airworthiness regulation.
19.19
Those charged with complying with airworthiness regulations are neither taught, nor examined, on the
subject, nor schooled in what are acceptable means of compliance.
(16) Regulations are too complex, prolix and obscure.
19.20
The current complexity, prolixity, and obscurity of the structure, content and language of the regulations
makes them virtually impenetrable and, frankly, a closed book to the majority of the congregation governed
by them. Much of the language is obscure, difficult to read, and repetitive. The sheer volume of regulations
with which officers are expected, or presumed to be familiar, is neither sensible nor realistic. This has all led
to the gradual marginalisation, misunderstanding, and mistrust of much of Defence regulations. The Review
has over 60 lever arch files of Defence regulations stretching back several decades. Such is the plethora
and disparate nature of the current regulatory documentation set, and the cloudy overlap between Safety,
Airworthiness and Environmental regulations, it is unrealistic to expect those charged with compliance to
assimilate, let alone implement, many of the regulations that now exist. The regulatory document set has
grown into a veritable pot pourri of guidance, policy, and regulation, lurching from the highly prescriptive
to the overly-relaxed, with regulations permitting all manner of local interpretation. This has encouraged
divergence in the way Airworthiness has been applied by individual IPTs and by Industry. The verbose
Airworthiness and Safety regulatory set is neither well understood nor applied. Nor does it provide the
clarity, purpose, or authority needed by those in Airworthiness positions. There is a need to cut away much
of this undergrowth. By way of comparison, the equivalent regulation document set used to govern Defence
Nuclear is concise and unambiguous and can readily be assimilated by users. Regulations should be succinct,
structured, coherent, consistent, comprehensive, and, above all, written in plain English. Good regulation is
axiomatic to any organisation. The more complex the organisation and product, the more important it is to
strive to keep regulations as simple as possible. Good simple regulation is key to providing the framework and
guidelines for the safe, efficient, and productive carrying out of Defence activities.
(17) The system of “Letters of Delegation” is imperfect.
19.21
Specific responsibility for safety and airworthiness is the subject of letters of authority called “Letters of
Delegation” (LOD). The LOD system purports to ‘cascade’ instructions and authority regarding safety and
to form a ‘chain’ of responsibility. In practice, however, LOD have operated to transfer ownership of safety
and airworthiness from the desks of higher ranks to lower ranks, i.e. pass-the-parcel, with little oversight
or monitoring. I have recommended that “Letters of Delegation” are rewritten to make them simpler and
9 European Aviation Safety Agency.