The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
Richard Oldfield’s notes shows the precise figures were known
11.81
282
It is clear that the senior BAE Systems representatives present were well aware when they went into the
Customer Acceptance Conference that a large number of hazards remained “Open” and “Unclassified”. Richard
Oldfield’s manuscript notes on his copy of the draft of Annex B show he had calculated the precise numbers and
percentages of hazards which remained “Unclassified”, namely 12 out of 66 Functional Hazards (18%) and 22
out of 39 Zonal Hazards (56%) respectively. The latter was a very high percentage. I have no doubt that Chris
Lowe and Eric Prince were equally aware of the figures.
Presentations
11.82
I have come to the conclusion that BAE Systems’ presentations at the Customer Acceptance Conference were
carefully tailored to skirt round some of the (uncomfortable) facts outlined above, and encourage the Nimrod
IPT and QinetiQ to the belief that PDS Task 06-3409 could be ‘signed-off’ forthwith and that final payment
could be made without unnecessary argument.
11.83 As set out in Chapter 10A, at the Customer Acceptance Conference, the Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ representatives
were given three main presentations:
11.84
161.1. First, a PowerPoint presentation by Richard Oldfield entitled “Programme status as at 31 August 2004”
in which he effectively represented that PDS Task 06-3409 had been completed, on the basis that
‘extant’ mitigation evidence had been “sourced for [all] 105 hazards” and entered into CASSANDRA
and that the six deliverable reports, including the final BLSC Reports for both Nimrod types, were all
“complete”.
161.2. Second, a PowerPoint presentation by Chris Lowe on the six reports. He gave a presentation of the
BLSC Reports comprising only the general sections but not the Executive Summary or Conclusion (which
had not yet been written, or at least not completed). He then presented full contents of the other
Reports, including the Fire & Explosion Report, highlighting the conclusion that the Nimrod types could
be considered “ALARP” so far as Fire & Explosion was concerned subject to minor recommendations.
161.3. Third, Witness C [BAE Systems] then gave a demonstration of how the CASSANDRA hazard log worked
and put up on screen the draft versions of what were to become Annexes B and C to the BLSC Reports
(the latter, with Chris Lowe’s assistance).
In the light of Richard Oldfield’s and Chris Lowe’s upbeat PowerPoint presentations, at the very least, clarification
of the figures and ALARP position was plainly called for. As Counsel to the Review succinctly put it to Richard
Oldfield in interview:
“MR PARSONS QC: ...[T]he most important thing to tell the customer, surely, is: “We have done all
we can do, but you cannot say this aircraft is ALARP, you cannot sign off the safety case, because
56 per cent of the zonal hazards are unmitigated”.
MR OLDFIELD: That was the purpose of those briefing notes [i.e. his manuscript figures].
...
MR PARSONS QC: So why does it not appear in a PowerPoint, in minutes, in notes, anywhere?
MR OLDFIELD: I can’t understand that myself. ... I would suspect that during the conference, that
would have been said, but there’s no definitive record. .. I may well have done it in the voiceovers for
the presentation. ...”