The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Chapter 11 – Nimrod Safety Case: Analysis and Criticisms
(8) QinetiQ was too compliant and eager to please the Nimrod IPT.
11.313 In my judgement, at the root of the problem so far as QinetiQ is concerned lies a worrying truth: QinetiQ was
too compliant and eager to please the customer and lost sight of its overriding duty, as independent advisor, to
remain objective and rigorous. QinetiQ did not want to risk upsetting the Nimrod IPT in case this damaged their
relationship and imperilled future business. It traded its duty for commercial expediency.
11.314 As Witness L [QinetiQ] explained to the Review:
“All work we did at QinetiQ was controlled by Internal Project Managers (“PMs”). They
authorised work packages and interfaced with the customer, i.e. the relevant IPT, for task
allocation and costing. In my view they were always stressed and on the back foot with
the IPTs. This always seemed to stem from the fact that the IPTs had an inherent belief that
QinetiQ were ‘robbing them’. I felt that they went to extraordinary lengths to keep their
IPT Leaders (“IPTLs”) happy. I also felt that QinetiQ generally was on occasion prepared to
modify its position for the same reason.”
11.315 This appears, unfortunately, to have been true in this case. It was the duty of QinetiQ in its role as “independent
advisor” to protect the Nimrod IPT, and to give the IPT objective, unvarnished advice. The duty of a safety
engineer is sometimes to point out difficulties and unpalatable truths.
QinetiQ culture – ‘bending over backwards to please the IPTs’
11.316 In my view, there was a prevailing problem with the culture at QinetiQ and its potentially compliant attitude to
the customer:
“MR PARSONS QC: If you were to use a word or phrase to sum up the attitude or the
culture that you experienced, what would that be?
WITNESS L [QinetiQ]: I wouldn’t say it was a negative safety culture, but I would say
that it was a culture that was “can do” for the IPTs. That was the problem with QinetiQ.
Because QinetiQ were bending over backwards to please the IPTs, doing what they felt
the customer wanted.
MR PARSONS QC: What did the customer want?
WITNESS L [QinetiQ]: The customer didn’t want problems. That was quite clear, and
that was made abundantly clear to me. “Take that out, the customer doesn’t want to hear
that.”
MR PARSONS QC: So of course, if the customer had wanted problems, if the customer
had said “We need to understand safety issues, we need you to question them”, that
would drive a different attitude?
WITNESS L [QinetiQ]: Certainly at QinetiQ that would have, yes, without a doubt.”
11.317 QinetiQ found itself in a slightly awkward situation of being given a ‘cold shoulder’ by the Nimrod IPT and BAE
Systems and not being furnished with all the information and full ISA status that it should have been accorded.
Nevertheless, it should have stood its ground and insisted on seeing and studying the BLSC Reports in full and
not supported the sign-off until it had done so. It was too submissive and meek.
(9) QinetiQ fundamentally failed to perform its duty as independent advisor to the
Nimrod IPT and was little more than a rubber stamp or cipher.
11.318 In my judgment, QinetiQ fundamentally failed to perform its duty as independent advisor to the Nimrod IPT and
was little more than a rubber stamp or cipher.
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