The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
11.166 There is little doubt that Chris Lowe was the dominant figure in the BAE Systems NSC management team. He
bears the heaviest responsibility for the poor planning, poor management and poor execution of the NSC. He
attempted in interview to distance himself from the project, suggesting that he was only keeping a ‘top level’
eye on what was going on, and Witness C [BAE Systems] was responsible for the day-to-day running of the
hazard assessment programme. But, in my judgment, he was clearly very much hands-on during both Phase 1
and Phase 2 of the NSC and aware of what was going on. He clearly considered himself as more knowledgeable
about Safety Cases than those around him. Most deferred to him. He was ambitious, both for himself and
for the company. He believed this to be an opportunity to demonstrate that his department was involved in
prestigious, cutting-edge work. He saw the NSC as a ‘showcase’ project which would enhance his standing
and open up new commercial possibilities for BAE Systems. His department was nominated for the Chairman’s
Bronze Award for innovation. On the back of the apparent success of the NSC, in December 2004, he made a
sales pitch to the Nimrod IPT to do ‘Operational’ Safety Cases.
11.167 Unfortunately, he underestimated the nature of the task and overestimated his own abilities. He did not take
kindly to suggestions from those who, on occasion, thought they knew better (like Witness K [BAE Systems]).
He was, at all material times, fully aware of the time problems that the project was running into. He turned a
blind eye to the use of MRA4 generic data. He insisted on a ‘final push’ to get completion. What really mattered
was producing an impressive-looking set of reports on time which could be trumpeted by his department as a
success. He was ultimately prepared to draw a veil over the incomplete nature of the work. The actual content,
quality and completeness of the work was not paramount important because he, like most others, assumed the
Nimrod to be ‘safe anyway’ because of its service history.
Richard Oldfield – NSC Project Leader
11.168 Richard Oldfield played a key role in the NSC between 2001 and 2005. He was appointed in 2001 as Task Leader
on the NSC. He played an important part in compiling the proposals for Phase 1 and 2 and acted as Project
Manager within TTRO Engineering. He was in charge of the zonal hazard assessments carried out on both
the MR2 and RMk1. He played a leading role at the Acceptance Conference on 31 August/1 September 2004
and the Sixth PSWG. He too (deliberately) did not come clean about the figures for “Open” and “Unclassified”
hazards and the large gap left in their analysis. It was his responsibility to monitor and manage the progress
of the NSC project. He failed to manage the project properly. He bears a significant responsibility for the poor
planning, poor management and poor execution of the NSC.
Eric Prince – Flight Systems and Avionics Manager
11.169 Eric Prince was the Flight Systems and Avionics Manager at the time, responsible (a) for Technical governance
for Avionics, Mechanical Systems and Electrical Systems design and development on Nimrod MR2 and R1 and
(b) as Team Leader for Electrical, Mechanical and Avionics systems Department. He played a key role in the
NSC between 2001 and 2005. He attended the Fault Tree Analysis Workshop (19-21 November 2002). He was
involved in the Zonal/Functional hazard assessment Pro-Forma process, including sign off of Hazards H73 and
H34 (February to September 2004). He was the line manager for Witness K [BAE Systems]. He attended the
Customer Acceptance Conference (31 August to 1 September 2004). He bears a significant responsibility for the
poor planning, poor management and poor execution of the NSC. He too was prepared to see the customer be
given a deliberately misleading impression as to the completeness of the work.
Nimrod Safety Case 2
11.170 I deal with criticisms of BAE Systems’ subsequent work in 2008-2009 on Nimrod Safety Case 2 in
Chapter 15.
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