The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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These roles and responsibilities were further depicted pictorially in the following organogram:
9.75 It should be noted that the SMP organogram envisaged ‘Operating Unit’ representation on the PSWG.
The
Review was informed, however, that whilst there was good attendance by representatives from both RAF
Kinloss and RAF Waddington at the early PSWG meetings, the attendance from RAF Kinloss waned somewhat
from mid-2003 onwards. However, it had been agreed at the first two meetings of the PSWG that ‘operational’
risks would be more appropriately dealt with at the separate Joint User Working Group. This decision, coupled
with the lengthy travelling time from RAF Kinloss to RAF Wyton, may well have been the cause of the decline
in Kinloss operators’ attendance. A concomitant result of this was that Kinloss no longer received copies of the
meetings’ minutes and would not have been aware of forthcoming PSWGs. Following the loss of XV230, RAF
Kinloss was added once more to the distribution list and their attendance resumed.
9.76
Paragraph 20 of Annex A to the SMP noted that a ‘safety culture’ was an essential requirement for the IPT.
Such a culture could not be imposed, but was to be fostered through: (1) communication; (2) training; (3) the
setting of personal objectives; and (4) “as broad an involvement of IPT members as possible”, to foster the
common ‘ownership’ of safety processes and to ensure that the process was ultimately workable and effective.
It is regrettable that these laudable aims were never successfully implemented in practice during the production
of the NSC. Indeed, it transpired that few of the members of the IPT were more than vaguely aware that the
NSC was being prepared at all.