The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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5. The total cost of implementing the Board of Inquiry recommendations has been estimated as being
in the region of £30-35 million.
6. I am satisfied that appropriate and timely steps have been, and continue to be, taken by the MOD
and the RAF to address the immediate airworthiness issues raised by the loss of XV230 and the Board
of Inquiry report and subsequent discoveries about the Nimrod fleet. Indeed, the level of scrutiny
now applied to the Nimrod fleet is such that it is probably one of the most closely monitored
operational military aircraft fleets in the world.
7. The successful continued operation of the Nimrod fleet post-XV230 is a tribute to the Nimrod
community and leadership at RAF Kinloss and RAF Waddington, and their parent Headquarters.
8. On the evidence to date, the review of the Nimrod Safety Case by BAE Systems in 2008-2009 (Safety
Case 2) has been largely valueless and a waste of time and money.
Introduction
15.1
15.2
15.3
15.4
15.5
15.6
Following my appointment to conduct this Review in December 2007, I requested that I be kept up-to-date
on all matters and developments relating to the technical safety of the Nimrod fleet as they came to light. In
accordance with my request, I have been kept closely informed by the MOD of: (a) all incidents, problems, surveys
and findings pertaining to the technical safety of the Nimrod fleet; (b) progress in implementing the Board of
Inquiry’s (BOI) post-XV230 recommendations; and (c) other programmes aimed at ensuring the airworthiness of
the Nimrod fleet and the safety of its crews.
I have not felt it necessary to issue an interim report in relation to any matter which has come to my attention
regarding the immediately safety or airworthiness of the Nimrod fleet; and, accordingly, have not done so.
The loss of XV230, the findings of the BOI and subsequent reported incidents and events, led to intense focus
on addressing the potential for fuel leaks and hot air duct failures in the Nimrod fleet. Following the loss of
XV230, there was an increase in reported fuel leaks. This was probably due to the increasing frequency of
inspection and the fact that leak inspections are now conducted with tanks and lines under pressure.
In the three years since the loss of XV230, the MOD and RAF have introduced a large number of measures to
safeguard the Nimrod fleet and its crews. This Chapter does not list every measure enacted, but simply outlines
some of the principal measures and significant post-XV230 events.
I am satisfied that appropriate and timely steps are being, and have been, taken by the MOD and the RAF
to address the immediate airworthiness issues raised by the loss of XV230, the BOI report and post-XV230
subsequent discoveries about the Nimrod fleet.
Indeed, the level of scrutiny now applied to the Nimrod fleet is such that it is probably one of the most closely
monitored operational military aircraft fleets in the world.
Immediate aftermath – UTIs and RTIs
15.7
In the immediate aftermath of the loss of XV230 and its crew, the Aircraft Operating Authority (AOA) and the
Nimrod Integrated Projected Team (IPT) placed a number of restrictions on the use of certain systems within
the aircraft. These restrictions were based on the reports of the Harrier pilot eyewitness who observed the
aircraft’s final moments and the content of the MAYDAY radio transmission made by the crew of XV230. The
former reported a fire on the starboard wing root of the aircraft, close to the fuselage, with a secondary fire
in the vicinity of the starboard rear fuselage, whilst the MAYDAY reported a fire in the aircraft’s bomb bay. The
implication of the fact that the aircraft had undertaken Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) a few minutes before the fire
began was also considered.