The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
NSC took four years and cost in excess of £400,000
10A.4
192
The development of the NSC formally commenced on 11 April 2001, when the Nimrod Integrated Project
Team (IPT) first contracted BAE Systems to begin the process of developing ‘safety cases’ for both the Nimrod
MR2 and R1 types. 5 The drawing up of platform safety cases was mandated by Joint Service Publication
(JSP)318B. The task was initially expected to be completed by 31 December 2002, i.e. within 20 months. 6
In fact, the whole process was to take until March 2005, i.e. nearly four years. 7 It was to cost in excess of
£400,000.
NSC failed to capture the risk which led to the loss of XV230
10A.5
Despite the length of time the NSC took to complete and the substantial cost involved, the NSC singularly
failed to achieve its purpose: to identify, assess and address all serious risks to the Nimrod fleet. The NSC failed,
in particular, to capture the serious catastrophic fire and explosion risks which the Cross-Feed/Supplementary
Conditioning Pack (SCP) duct and the Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) modification posed to the Nimrod fleet. If
it had been carried out properly and carefully it would have captured these risks. Had it done so, the loss of
XV230 in September 2006 would have been prevented.
Organisations involved in NSC
10A.6
Three organisations were involved in the process of developing the NSC during the period 2001-2005:
BAE Systems,
which was the Design Authority (DA) for the Nimrod aircraft and formally tasked by the
Nimrod IPT to draw up the NSC for the two aircraft types, with offices at Chadderton.
The Nimrod IPT,
which was the ‘Integrated Project Team’ within the Defence Logistics Organisation
(DLO), with specific responsibility for the Nimrod MR2 and R1 fleets, with offices based at RAF Wyton.
QinetiQ,
which acted as ‘independent advisor’ to the Nimrod IPT in relation to the NSC, and whose
main office for the purpose of the safety assessment of military aeroplanes is based at Boscombe
Down.
Key individuals involved in NSC
10A.7
The key individuals involved in the development of the NSC were:
At BAE Systems: The three key figures in BAE Systems in charge of managing Phases 1 and 2 of the NSC
task: (1) Chris Lowe, Chief Airworthiness Engineer; (2) Richard Oldfield, NSC Task Leader; and (3) Eric
Prince, Flight Systems and Avionics Manager.
At the Nimrod IPT: The three key figures in the Nimrod IPT with responsibility for airworthiness and
safety and the NSC: (1) Group Captain (now Air Commodore) George Baber, as the Nimrod IPT Leader
(IPTL) and Project Engineer with overall responsibility for airworthiness; (2) Wing Commander Michael
Eagles, as Head of Air Vehicle with general responsibility for the production of the NSC under the Safety
Management Plan (SMP); and (3) Frank Walsh, as Safety Manager and primary point of contact with the
BAE Systems’ NSC team to whom the task of managing the NSC project was delegated.
At QinetiQ: The two key figures at QinetiQ who had responsibilities in respect of the NSC were: Martyn
Mahy, the designated Task Manager during the majority of Phase 2 of the NSC project; and (2) Colin
Blagrove, Technical Assurance Manager.
5 PDS Task Request Form number AV(PDS)814 drafted by the Nimrod IPT (NIM(ES)AV(PDS), SPTO).
6 PDS Task AV(PDS)814, dated 11 April 2001.
7 Letter from Nimrod IPT Leader, Group Captain George Baber: DLO (Strike)(WYT)5 12725/27/1 Nimrod, dated 22 February 2005; followed by e-mail
from Frank Walsh, the Nimrod IPT Safety Manager, dated 16 March 2005.