The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Future
Chapter 19 – Shortcomings of Current System
19.31 A new set of Principles ( Chapter 20) is required and a new Military Airworthiness Regime is called for
(Chapter 21).
Shortcomings in Safety Case regime, Aged Aircraft, Personnel, Industry, Procurement, and Culture
19.32
There are also the following further major shortcomings which need to be addressed:
an inadequate and wasteful Safety Case regime ( Chapter 22);
an inadequate appreciation of the needs of Aged Aircraft ( Chapter 23);
weaknesses in the area of Personnel ( Chapter 24);
an unsatisfactory relationship between the MOD and Industry ( Chapter 25);
an unacceptable Procurement process ( Chapter 26); and
a Safety Culture that does not work ( Chapter 27).
RAF “Capability Health Check” (August 2008)
19.33
15 I am fortified in my above findings and my Recommendations by having recently seen the results of a detailed
survey carried out by the RAF on itself. The survey was commissioned by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff
(ACAS). The results of the survey are contained in a document entitled “Capability Health Check”, 16 dated 18
August 2008. Upon recently becoming aware of the survey I asked to see the report. It is a remarkably candid
document with a stark assessment of the current state of certain aspects of the RAF. It deserves extensive
citation in this Report because it highlights some of the major issues which most concern me.
19.34 I set out below the most important and pertinent passages in the “Capability Health Check” survey which
confirm or support many of the finding which I have made in this Report (and also my own impressions having
conducted numerous interviews of, and discussions with, personnel of all ranks, including a large number
at RAF Kinloss at all levels, over many days), and reinforces the necessity for many of the Recommendations
which I make in subsequent Chapters:
19.34.1 “. .... Officers and airmen at all levels convey the feeling they lack the guidance, prioritisation of
task and resources to accomplish their jobs. Near continuous structural and functional change
at [Command], Group and Station level has resulted in a perceived lack of clarity, structure and
purpose.” (Executive Summary, paragraph 2).
19.34.2 “ ... The findings of the [Capability Health Check] lead to the conclusion that the RAF is able to
execute the missions it is required to carry out but is eroding across a range of capabilities due to
lack of sufficient resources and organisational complexities.” (Executive Summary, paragraph 3).
19.34.3 “Preamble ...the implications of lack of manpower and resources, change-weariness and failing
industrial support were universal.” (paragraph 1).
19.34.4 “Control of Resources. Commanders feel less empowered than in the past to control manning,
logistical support, infrastructure, In respect of manpower and logistical support, they felt they did
not directly control many of the levers that deliver operational output, such as manpower levels
and skills mix, stockholding levels of components, degrees of external tasking, the contractual
delivery of airframes and contractor compliance. Part of the disempowerment is a result of 15 years
of initiatives and structural changes across the RAF and Defence, combined with unprecedented
15 See Chapters 20 to 27.
16 20080818-CHX EXECSUM-RSM
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