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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />

13.23<br />

De-layering<br />

364<br />

<strong>The</strong> reality can look like Figure 13.2 (below).<br />

GOOD GOVERNANCE<br />

SAFETY/AIRWORTHINESS<br />

Projects/IPTS<br />

Figure 13.2: Orthogonal values in practice<br />

ENGINEERING BEST PRACTICE<br />

QUALITY ASSURANCE<br />

13.24 <strong>The</strong> process of devolution or ‘federation’ of responsibility to IPTs and IPTLs also involved ‘de-layering’, i.e.<br />

the removal of intermediate layers of management and oversight which had hitherto been provided by, e.g.,<br />

DG Technical Services, which had provided assurance and auditing functions, checks and balances. This was<br />

to ‘empower’ IPTLs and make IPTs fully ‘self-standing’. Some 100 IPTs were created which, therefore, had<br />

great freedom and independence to manage their platforms ‘end-to-end’, i.e. throughout the CADMID12 cycle, as they saw fit. But, IPTs were, to some extent, cast adrift by this process. <strong>The</strong> IPT model was heavily<br />

dependent on the right calibre of people, capable of managing complex organisations and operating with<br />

sufficient time, resources, guidance and oversight. As the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT proved, however, it was not always<br />

easy to manage priorities correctly or balance functional values with project outputs. “Project Engineers were<br />

lonely”, as one senior official put it to me.<br />

Change was difficult<br />

13.25<br />

In my view, changing Defence Procurement and Logistics in the way envisaged by the SDR was always going<br />

to be very difficult. <strong>The</strong>re were a number of obvious reasons why. First, there are obvious and significant<br />

differences between procuring for Industry and procuring for Defence. <strong>The</strong> former involves commercial<br />

firms driven by profits and bonus schemes, with everyone normally coming from homogenous organisations<br />

with similar aims and measures of success. <strong>The</strong> latter involves a variety of competing Service Personnel,<br />

Civil Servants, and Industry, often with widely differing agendas, budgets, and motivation (public service<br />

or profit). <strong>The</strong> former often involves incremental procurement. <strong>The</strong> latter involves long-term decisions and<br />

risks concerning cutting-edge technology years hence. Second, the turnover of civil servants and military<br />

personnel in post is often rapid, since the most able are moved around to broaden their experience leading to<br />

a loss of continuity. Indeed, promotion in the military depends upon achieving a rapid succession and breadth<br />

of two-year postings (McKinsey recommended that Directors and IPTLs should remain five years in post but<br />

this did not always happen). Third, brokering smooth ‘civil partnerships’ between the two different cultures of<br />

military and industry is often easier in the saying than the doing. Fourth, the military are rightly, and naturally,<br />

trained, focused and busy dealing with the day job, being part of a fighting force and meeting the day-to-day<br />

challenges of military exigencies and demands.<br />

12 Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Management, In-Service and Disposal.

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