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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />

10 May 2004: Design <strong>Review</strong> meeting<br />

10A.127 A further internal BAE Systems NSC Design <strong>Review</strong> meeting on 10 May 2004 showed further slow progress<br />

being made by BAE Systems on Phase 2. <strong>The</strong> rationalisation of hazards from 1,300 to 105 had been<br />

completed. But of the 55 rationalised hazards which were “on the street” (i.e. had been given to the Specialist<br />

Departments) only six had been returned, including only one by Witness K [BAE Systems]. <strong>The</strong>re had been<br />

no input yet from Electrical Systems, which had a “resource problem”. Witness C [BAE Systems] criticised the<br />

“poor pre-planning” of the project and Witness K [BAE Systems] said in evidence that he felt “the cart was<br />

before the horse”, namely an estimate had been made before working out the pro-forma procedure. Good<br />

project management would have been to work out the procedure to be adopted first, and then to have made<br />

the man-hours estimate.<br />

10A.128 At the meeting, Witness K [BAE Systems]’s draft Functional Mech Systems Pro-Forma was considered. It<br />

included a ‘Summary and Conclusion’ section which required Mech Systems to carry out an analysis of the<br />

post-control probability status of each hazard, i.e. an assessment of its probability after the Phase 2 work had<br />

considered what measures had been taken to reduce any risk. <strong>The</strong>re was a discussion between Eric Prince,<br />

on behalf of Mech Systems, and Witness C [BAE Systems], on behalf of the Airworthiness Department, as to<br />

whether the Pro-Formas should include any analysis of a post-control probability. As noted above, previously<br />

it had been the Airworthiness Department’s position, as expressed by Chris Lowe, that the assignment of a<br />

post-control probability was not Mech Systems’ role but should be done by the Airworthiness Department<br />

alone. Chris Lowe was, however, not present at this meeting. In his absence, it was eventually agreed that<br />

Mech Systems should do both the document search and the analysis assigning the post-control probability,<br />

notwithstanding the fact that the Mech Systems’ budget estimate had not allowed for this. Witness K [BAE<br />

Systems]’s draft Functional Mech Systems Pro-Forma was adopted.<br />

MOD’s guidance on Safety Cases<br />

10A.129 At the meeting, Witness K [BAE Systems] circulated a copy of the Safety Case chapter in the MOD’s “An<br />

Introduction to System Safety Management & Assurance” 66 which set out in pithy form, the basic requirements<br />

of a safety case. <strong>The</strong> MOD’s guidance also explained that safety cases must be “tailored” to reflect the<br />

differences of legacy systems, and pointed out some of the difficulties of legacy systems, including finding<br />

original design information and justifications for developmental decisions. Following the meeting on 10 May<br />

2004, Witness K [BAE Systems] circulated a message summarising his understanding of the requirements for<br />

the mitigation of zonal hazards laid down by the Airworthiness Department, which he believed called for an<br />

“objective response” and “best judgment” or estimate by Mech Systems in the light of the ZHA description,<br />

photo and any drawings that could be found.<br />

13 May 2004: Witness K [BAE Systems]’s dissatisfaction with minutes<br />

10A.130 On 13 May 2004, Witness K [BAE Systems] expressed his dissatisfaction and disquiet to Witness Q [BAE<br />

Systems] that a number of previous concerns which had been raised by him and others at meetings had not<br />

been minuted. <strong>The</strong>se were not insignificant concerns and included the fact that a full Hazard Report was<br />

too time consuming; there were ‘limitations’ on archive search, no Comet data was being found; there was<br />

a lack of ideal historical or mechanical systems evidence, the archive search was not “value for £”; the initial<br />

Mech Systems’ estimate had been for an evidence search only not analysis; and the fact that a safety case<br />

structure as to what was required should have been produced initially and would still be of use. Witness Q<br />

[BAE Systems] responded that the minutes were only meant to be a brief summary and he could attach his<br />

own Mech Systems minutes if he so wished.<br />

18 May 2004 – optimistic report to Fifth PSWG Meeting<br />

10A.131 <strong>The</strong> Fifth PSWG Meeting took place on 18 May 2004, chaired by George Baber. Also present were Michael<br />

Eagles and Frank Walsh from the IPT, and Martyn Mahy from QinetiQ. Chris Lowe attended on behalf of<br />

BAE Systems and reported on the progress of the NSC. <strong>The</strong> minutes record: “Mr Lowe gave a presentation<br />

indicating the level of work that had been completed on Phase 2 and stated that the work should be<br />

66 See Chapter 9.<br />

218

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