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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />

180<br />

9.62.2 Another change was to the Risk Classification Table contained in the annexes – the newer edition<br />

included a further Accident Probability Category of “Incredible”.<br />

9.62.3 Issue 3 also included in the annexes a Generic Hazard Log Flowchart which set out a generic process<br />

that IPTs should adopt to ensure that the information recorded within the hazard log was correct.<br />

Guidance for Safety Cases<br />

9.63 Given the deadline in Issues 2 and 3 of BP1201, just what guidance was available to the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT as to how in<br />

fact to implement the requisite SMS, carry out the required risk analysis, and ultimately produce the Safety Case?<br />

9.64 As indicated above, in terms of practical guidance ( i.e. explaining how to actually produce a Safety Case), the<br />

relevant military regulations dealing with Safety Cases were somewhat thin, focusing instead on the aims of the<br />

Safety Case and the guiding principles to be applied. Indeed, in paragraph 0.4 of Issue 2 of Def-Stan 00-56,<br />

it was expressly stated “This Standard assumes a working knowledge of the techniques for hazard analysis<br />

and safety assessment”. This ‘assumption’ is perhaps what led Frank Walsh (the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT Safety Manager)<br />

to complain to ES(Air) in relation to a draft version of Issue 3 of Def-Stan 00-56 about the “lack of a hazard<br />

assessment framework” and “the lack of any suggested Hazard Log format”. 89 That said, arguably the best<br />

practical guidance in terms of the relevant military regulations was in fact to be found in the Guidance in Part 2<br />

of Def-Stan 00-56, Issue 2 which, amongst other things:<br />

9.65<br />

9.66<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Provided a suggested Hazard Log structure and a breakdown of the information that it should<br />

include; 90<br />

Sought to explain how to carry out Hazard Identification, including explaining the concepts, tasks and<br />

requirements involved in Preliminary Hazard Analysis, System Hazard Analysis, Functional Analysis and<br />

Zonal Analysis;<br />

Sought to explain the objective, formulation and application of safety criteria, including the different<br />

severity and probability categories; and<br />

Sought to explain risk estimation, including how to identify accident sequences and how to categorise<br />

accidents.<br />

Whilst this Guidance was undoubtedly more helpful than the very limited contents of JSP318B, the reader could<br />

be forgiven for still wondering how best to go about actually performing e.g. a functional or zonal analysis. <strong>The</strong><br />

same may be said of earlier, non-regulatory guidance, such as the “Guidance for the provision of an aircraft<br />

Safety Case” 91 produced by the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) 92 and issued back in March<br />

1998. 93 Again, this identified the guiding principles and purpose of a Safety Case but did not specify just how<br />

one was to go about identifying the possible hazards which could arise. A balance needs to be struck between<br />

pure ‘goal-based’ regulations and overly prescriptive regulations.<br />

It is nonetheless clear that, at least by 2002, there was an understanding within (at least parts of) the MOD of<br />

the fundamental aims and philosophy that should underpin a Safety Case. <strong>The</strong> very least that can be said is that<br />

there was material available which set out the aims of Lord Cullen’s recommendations in the Piper Alpha report.<br />

Most notably in this respect, in 2002, Advantage Technical Consulting under contract to the MOD produced<br />

Issue 1 of “An Introduction to System Safety Management & Assurance”. This has come to be known as the<br />

‘White Booklet’ and is still freely available today (as amended) 94 on the MOD intranet, 95 described as an “entrylevel<br />

reference for system safety management”, its stated purpose being to provide an introduction to system<br />

safety management concepts, terms and activities.<br />

89 Email from Frank Walsh to ES(Air), dated 1 March 2004.<br />

90 Def-Stan 00-56 (Part 2), Issue 2, paragraph 5.8.<br />

91 DERA/AT&E/MC/TR0005/1.0.<br />

92 Forerunner to QinetiQ.<br />

93 See, in a similar vein, “Scoping Study for a Generic Specification on the Retrospective Application of Safety Cases to UK Military Helicopters”, Report<br />

Number 305E287/1, dated June 1999, prepared by BMT Reliability Consultants Limited for the Defence Helicopter Support Authority.<br />

94 <strong>The</strong> current edition is Issue 2, dated July 2005, which expands slightly upon the earlier version.<br />

95 http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/DefenceEstateandEnvironmentPublications/ASEG/<br />

<strong>The</strong>whiteBookletAnIntroductionToSystemSafetyManagementAndAssurance.htm

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