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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Nimrod</strong> Inquest: May 2008<br />

16.1<br />

440<br />

Coronial jurisdiction is geographical. On 13 September 2006, the bodies of the crew of XV230 were repatriated<br />

to RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire with full military honours. Jurisdiction for conducting the inquests into the<br />

deaths of the crew of XV230 lay, therefore, with the Oxfordshire Coroner’s Court. A joint Inquest took place<br />

before the Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner (Andrew Walker) between 6 and 23 May 2008. <strong>The</strong> major<br />

parties, namely the MOD, BAE Systems, QinetiQ and the families, were represented by legal Counsel (and<br />

Michael Bell represented the siblings and parents of Flight Sergeant Gerard Martin Bell). I closely monitored<br />

the proceedings using Counsel present throughout the hearing (Peter Ferrer), and Counsel to the <strong>Review</strong> (Luke<br />

Parsons QC and Caroline Pounds) who were present for certain parts of the evidence. <strong>The</strong> Inquest lasted<br />

three weeks and attracted much sensational publicity. On analysis, however, the Inquest produced little factual<br />

evidence of value to the <strong>Review</strong>.<br />

Legal nature of an Inquest<br />

16.2<br />

16.3<br />

A coroner’s inquest is essentially a limited factual inquiry into the circumstances leading to the loss of life. A<br />

coroner is required by s. 11(5)(b) of the Coroners Act 1988 and Rule 36(1)(b) of the Coroner’s Rules to set out the<br />

particulars regarding the identity of the deceased and when, where and how the deceased came by their death.<br />

Rule 42 of the Coroner’s Rules specifies that “No verdict shall be framed in such a way as to appear to determine<br />

any question of (a) criminal liability on the part of any person or (b) civil liability...”. “How” was interpreted by<br />

the Court of Appeal in ex parte Jamieson [1995] QB 1 as meaning simply “by what means”. It was argued by<br />

Counsel for the families (Michael Rawlinson) that the circumstances of the XV230 accident gave rise to questions<br />

of “actual or potential state responsibility” 1 , and, accordingly, there should be a coroner’s investigation under<br />

Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 2 applying the wider definition of “how” set out<br />

by Lord Bingham in R (Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner (2004) 17 BHRC 49, 3 namely “by what means and<br />

in what circumstances”. <strong>The</strong> Coroner ruled, however, that this was not necessary on the basis that the State’s<br />

duty to carry out an Article 2 investigation would be satisfied “jointly” by his inquest and the <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>Review</strong>. 4<br />

<strong>The</strong> Coroner’s task in a case as complex as XV230 was far from straightforward. Moreover, an inquest with an<br />

emotionally charged atmosphere is not an ideal forum for analysing highly technical matters.<br />

Coroner’s verdict<br />

16.4 <strong>The</strong> Coroner, sitting without a jury, gave a lengthy narrative verdict and entered a verdict of “Accidental Death”.<br />

I have studied the Coroner’s narrative verdict and make the following points regarding his findings: 5<br />

16.4.1 First, the Coroner’s finding as to the most likely fuel source did not accord with the realistic probabilities.<br />

He said the most likely source for the fuel was a leak from the fuel feed system to engines Nos. 3 and 4<br />

which would have provided “a continuous source of fuel” which would “travel along the aircraft into dry<br />

bay 7” to the seat of the fire. I am satisfied, however, that this mechanism is highly unlikely. As I explain<br />

in Chapter 5, it is highly unlikely that a leak from the fuel feed system to engines Nos. 3 and 4 would<br />

have resulted in a sufficient quantity of fuel making its way into the starboard No. 7 Tank Dry Bay. <strong>The</strong><br />

pipes for the fuel feed system to engines Nos. 3 and 4 are located at the leading edge of the starboard<br />

wing. For fuel to reach the No. 7 Tank Dry Bay from this point it would have to follow a convoluted<br />

path which would involve: (a) tracking back some 17 feet; (b) crossing numerous lateral members; (c)<br />

passing through an almost solid dividing wall; and (d) avoiding air vent holes in Rib 1 which would also<br />

act as fluid drains, before reaching the point of ignition. <strong>The</strong>re is no significant history of leaks from this<br />

location. As the US Air Force Safety Centre commented, this scenario has “a very low probability with<br />

no supporting evidence of feasibility” (see Chapter 3). <strong>The</strong>re are other, far more probable, scenarios.<br />

1 C.f. R(Hurst) v London Northern District Coroner [2007] 2 AC 189; and Jordan v UK (2001) 11 BHRC 1, where the court held that in appropriate cases<br />

deaths involving state bodies the investigation was “to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility” (paragraph [105]).<br />

2 <strong>The</strong> European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was incorporated into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 on 2 October 2000.<br />

3 Ibid, paragraph [35].<br />

4 Inquest transcript, 7 May 2008, page 5, fourth paragraph.<br />

5 Coroner’s narrative verdict, 23 May 2008.

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