The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

10A.19
Chapter 10A – Nimrod Safety Case: The Facts (Phases 1 and 2)
“An individual or team, from an independent organization, that undertakes audits and
other assessment activities to provide assurance that safety activities comply with planned
arrangements, are implemented effectively and are suitable to achieve objectives; and
whether related outputs are correct, valid and fit for purpose.”
It does not appear, however, that QinetiQ was subsequently ever formally tasked with the role of Independent
Safety Auditor. QinetiQ was tasked, however, and de facto assumed, a role as ‘independent advisor’ in
relation to the development of the NSC and was at all material times assumed by the Nimrod IPT and BAE
Systems to have such a role (see further below).
4 December 2001: BAE Systems agree to issue proposal
10A.20
It was not until eight months later, following a meeting with the Nimrod IPT at RAF Wyton on 4 December
2001, that BAE Systems formally agreed to issue a proposal for the production of a baseline safety argument
with firm costs to be presented at the first Platform Safety Working Group (PSWG) meeting due early
2002. 18
27 January 2002
10A.21
10A.22
On 27 January 2002, the Nimrod IPT wrote to BAE Systems confirming the MOD’s decision that the Nimrod
MR2 and R1 were to be treated as “combat aircraft” for the purpose of safety management. This meant
that the MR2 and R1 Nimrods were expected to meet the military standard of safety under Def-Stan 00-56,
namely, that no credible failure shall lead to a catastrophic failure in less than 10-6 flying hours. 19 They would
not be required to meet the higher level of safety (10-7 ) expected of aircraft derived from civil airliners used by
the MOD in a passenger-carrying role. 20 This was, in my judgment, a logical and correct decision. Although
derived from the civilian Comet airliner, the Nimrod MR2 and R1 types embodied extensive changes, carried
stores and equipment, did not have a passenger-carrying role, were capable of equipment and bomb release,
flew in combat zones and therefore had a distinct, offensive military role. The letter concluded: “Nevertheless,
this decision will not prevent us aiming for the highest possible standards of safety that can reasonably be
achieved, given the age and complexity of the platform and the operating environment concerned”. 21
On the same day, the then Head of Air Vehicle at the Nimrod IPT wrote thanking BAE Systems for an early
draft of BAE Systems’ Feasibility Study22 (see further below) and stating that he was extremely pleased with
it. He went on to explain that, whilst the MOD decision to classify the MR2 and R1 as “combat aircraft”
provided a more “realistic” basis for safety considerations for the remaining life of the Nimrod platform, “I
stress that there is no intention for any relaxation of approach”. It should be noted that the draft Feasibility
Study suggested the involvement of the Aircrew Standards and Evaluation Unit (STANEVAL) in the Phase
1 process. It is unfortunate that this suggestion was never taken up because it might have meant greater
operator involvement in the Safety Case process.
5 February 2002: QinetiQ Task Review Meeting
10A.23
At a QinetiQ Task Review Meeting on 5 February 2002 there was a suggestion that QinetiQ would be asked
to play “a key role” in Nimrod safety management as the Independent Safety Auditor and that financial
provision would be made to this end. It was also noted that BAE Systems had been tasked to produce the
NSC and QinetiQ’s involvement could be discussed at the next PSWG meeting on 18 March 2002.
18 BAE Systems Task Acceptance Form No. 16 3151.
19 i.e. one in a million flying hours.
20 A troop carrying role was specified in the original RAF Air Staff Requirement but has never been fitted or used
21 See letter: NIM IPT ES(Air)(WYT)/512707/27/NIM IPT, dated 27 January 2002.
22 Draft BAE Systems Report MBU-DEF-C-NIM-SC04444, Issue 1, dated January 2002.
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