The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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Upon being advised of the aircraft’s loss, the detachment commander at XV230’s Deployed Operational Base
immediately took the requisite action and temporarily impounded the relevant documents. He was also advised
that Nimrod operations in support of Coalition Ground Forces must continue without interruption. Nimrod flying
operations could not, however, continue without the relevant operational documents that he had temporarily
impounded. In a remote overseas location, within the timescale he needed them, the detachment commander
could not simply request a set of replacement documents from the United Kingdom. He could, of course, have
photocopied the documents, but to do so would have involved a significant and disproportionate amount
of effort by detachment personnel, who were at this time heavily engaged in the conflict. Accordingly, the
detachment commander released the documents to his operations staff.
One of the documents returned to the operations room to enable the Nimrod detachment to continue to fulfil
its tasking was the “Stop Press Folder”. This folder housed all the recently issued documents that the detachment
commander and operations staff felt that aircrew should be aware of, for example, details of ground operations,
local airfield reports, flight safety reports. To keep the folder to a manageable size, those papers that no longer
have any validity, or had been incorporated in other documents, are regularly destroyed. This was standard
practice on all Nimrod squadrons and detachments.
On a night between the loss of XV230 and the arrival of the BOI, the (busy) detachment commander sanctioned
a request by one of his staff to conduct a routine destruction of material in the Stop Press Folder. This was a
mistake. All of the material should have been safely retained ready for examination by the BOI when it arrived.
Nonetheless, as soon as the BOI arrived in theatre, the detachment commander realising the mistake, appraised
them of what had occurred and the fact was recorded formally in the BOI’s evidence. 39 The BOI took a copy of
the list of destroyed documents and determined that there was nothing within them that could be immediately
relevant to their investigation. Indeed, over the months that followed none of the documents was required by
the BOI. The file was unlikely to contain anything of direct relevance to the loss of XV230 and it could, in the
main, have been reconstituted if required.
15.55 The matter of the destruction of some of the contents of the “Stop Press Folder” was understandably raised by
the families’ Counsel at the Inquest in May 2008 and the detachment commander was called to give evidence
to explain what happened.
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In my view, the detachment commander’s immediate admission of his error to the BOI displayed admirable
honesty and integrity. He must have been working under intense pressure at the time in coping both with the
aftermath of the accident and ensuring the continuance of current operations (and, by all accounts, he showed
considerable leadership and professionalism). It was a small and, as it transpired, irrelevant error made by
someone who was exceptionally busy and under significant pressure. Individuals must be confident that they
can admit such errors without attracting undeserved criticism or sanction. In this case, I am pleased to note
that the RAF authorities placed this mistake in its proper context and made no negative comment whatsoever.
I entirely concur with that approach.
Having carefully looked into the matter, I have no doubt that the destruction of these few documents was
entirely inadvertent and innocent and is of no significance.
Professionalism and dedication of Nimrod community and leadership
15.58
The continued operation and deployment in theatre of the Nimrod fleet following the loss of XV230 in September
2006 has not been easy. Those charged with operating and maintaining the Nimrod fleet have had to cope with
unprecedented but understandable media and public attention, numerous visits from top brass, intense scrutiny
from outside agencies (including the Nimrod Review) and the implementation of a welter of numerous new
inspection, maintenance and repair procedures. The fact that the Nimrod fleet has continued to fly successfully
in support of Coalition Forces, in the face of all these challenges, is a tribute to the cool professionalism and
dedication of the RAF Nimrod community at RAF Kinloss and RAF Waddington and the strong leadership
shown by the Station Commanders (Group Captain Jerry Kessell and Group Captain Robbie Noel at RAF Kinloss
and Group Captain Andy Fryer and Group Captain Rich Powell at RAF Waddington and Senior Executives
39 Evidence of Detachment Commander.