The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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maintenance on behalf of the RAF. BAE Systems also had considerable resources in terms of manpower, and
scientific and engineering know-how. It was, therefore, natural and understandable that the Nimrod IPT
should have approached BAE Systems to develop the Safety Case for the Nimrod MR2 and R1 at the outset.
BAE Systems could be expected to, and was, in my view, required to use its knowledge and experience and
all reasonable skill and care in producing the NSC.
18 March 2002: Inaugural PSWG Meeting
10A.33
The first ‘Inaugural’ PSWG Meeting took place at RAF Wyton on 18 March 2002 and was chaired by the then
IPTL (from whom George Baber took over in May 2002). Some 29 people were present, including 12 members
of the Nimrod IPT, five representatives of BAE Systems, two representatives of QinetiQ, one from Rolls Royce,
two from RAF Kinloss and two from RAF Waddington. Such large meetings were commonplace.
10A.34 The IPTL explained that there was already “a high level of confidence in Nimrod safety” but JSP318B required
that the IPT “improve the evidence to support that confidence” and develop a baseline safety case. The then
Head of Air Vehicle37 explained that the aim of the meeting was to draw together personnel from the Units,
Industry, Group, QinetiQ and the IPT “to discuss the principles and processes of the new [baseline safety case]
system” and to ensure that there were no fundamental concerns. He gave a presentation on the safety case
principles and processes envisaged and stated that the “IPT Leader must consider a complete and structured
assessment of the risks so that he can formally accept them”.
10A.35
The BAE Systems Engineering Manager present, Witness B [BAE Systems], paid tribute to the designers,
builders, managers, maintainers and operators who had ensured the continued safe operation of the Nimrod
“over the past 30 years”, but warned against “the dangers of complacency” and said that BAE Systems would
“enthusiastically embrace the safety case philosophy”. Chris Lowe, the BAE Systems’ Chief Airworthiness
Engineer, gave a PowerPoint presentation emphasising that mere standards could not replace “domain
expertise and knowledge”, and that in order for the identification and addressing of all safety hazards the
PSWG needed to be made up of “players with genuine expert knowledge”. The final slide promised that
BAE Systems would produce “a workable and cost effective” solution for “completion” of the baseline safety
argument to demonstrate that “the Nimrod fleet is acceptably safe”.
Decision that MRA4 data should not be used
10A.36 During the meeting, a QinetiQ representative asked Chris Lowe whether use was going to be made of “MRA4
hazard data”. Chris Lowe answered “No” and that the MRA data was to be kept “out of [the] loop” because
the aircraft were “significantly different in roles and systems”. Chris Lowe was questioned in interview by
the Review about this exchange. His attempt to explain it by suggesting that he and QinetiQ were referring
to ‘qualification’ data not ‘hazard’ data was, in my view, unsatisfactory and unconvincing: QinetiQ expressly
referred to “MRA4 hazard data” (emphasis added) in the context of data to sentence NSC hazards; and in
2002 the MRA4 was a ‘paper’ aircraft and would not, therefore, have had much, if any, ‘qualification’ data.
It is noteworthy that two years earlier, Witness A [BAE Systems] had expressed similar concern at using the
MRA4 SMP as a basis for the MR2 SMP. 38 I have no doubt that both he and QinetiQ were referring to MRA4
hazard data, and it was clear to everyone at the meeting that it should not be used to sentence MR2 and R1
risks.
10A.37
In these circumstances, it is surprising and regrettable that, in July 2004, BAE Systems subsequently made
significant use of generic hazard data used for the MRA4 programme to sentence MR2 and R1 hazards, in
order, it appears, to speed up the finalising of the NSC and to meet the 31 August 2004 deadline.
25 April 2002: BAE Systems’ internal meeting raises question mark over resources
10A.38
Notwithstanding BAE Systems’ external expressions of confidence in its Feasibility Study, concerns were
expressed internally from an early stage as to whether there were sufficient manpower resources to deliver
the task. At an internal BAE Systems meeting on 25 April 2002, Richard Oldfield expressed concern that BAE
37 (Wing Commander Michael Eagles’ predecessor).
38 At the Design Authority Safety Working Group (DASWG) meeting held on 19 November 2001.