The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
Guidance
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Man-hours
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11.39
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Review that the NSC task had been discussed both internally, and also with the IPT, with a view to defining the
scope of the work, in particular, at a meeting on 3 December 2001. However, in my view, this was no substitute
for proper scoping of the work. It is instructive that BAE Systems did not even investigate its own archives until
March 2004, i.e. during the course of Phase 2, notwithstanding with the express requirement to do so in PDS
Task AV(PDS) 814 at the outset. BAE Systems’ archives should have been sorted out, indexed and examined at
the outset to see what relevant material they might, or might not, have contained. Further, BAE Systems also
ought arguably to have carried out a ‘dry run’ of a specimen hazard and zone, with a view to ensuring both
that the complexities of the process were properly understood and scoped, and that the results of Phase 1
were going to be adequate to support Phase 2. Only by doing these things would BAE Systems be in a position
properly to begin to assess the likely scale of work, the manpower and resources required and the timescale
involved. Richard Oldfield did, in fact, suggest that a ‘dummy run’ be carried out to check his estimates; but
this was never done. BAE Systems rather stumbled into the task assuming that it was going to be a fairly
straightforward documentary exercise. It was to prove anything but straightforward.
Third, there was little, if any, guidance forthcoming from the Airworthiness Department in the early stages of
the project as to: (a) whether the ‘assessment’ of each hazard was to be carried out in Phase 1 or Phase 2; (b) by
whom such assessment was to be carried out; (c) the level of assessment and analysis required; and (d) the basis
on which the platform was to be assessed, i.e. whether ‘as-designed’, ‘as-built’ or ‘as-is’ (see further below).
Further, there appears to have been a lack of understanding that the ‘assessment’ phase and ‘mitigation’ phase
should, in fact, have been separate processes. “Mitigation” was not used in the usual sense of the word, namely
to indicate a fresh step taken to control or minimise a risk. Rather, it was used by BAE Systems to indicate the
process of finding existing evidence of controls on the risk. This was, however, part of the assessment of the
risk process. There remained a difference of view in evidence to the Review between e.g. Richard Oldfield and
Chris Lowe as to what parts of the risk assessment process should have been done in Phase 1and Phase 2
respectively.
Fourth, BAE Systems’ poor pre-planning led to it under-estimating the man-hours required for Phase 2 and
under-resourcing Phase 2 (see further below). In these circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising that BAE Systems’
work in relation to Phase 2 subsequently began to unravel and fall behind.
In its evidence to the Review, BAE Systems pointed to the numerous meetings, e-mails and memos which it
submitted demonstrated its good pre-planning. Quantity, however, does not equal quality. In my view, the
BAE Systems’ personnel responsible for the NSC simply did not think through the planning properly, or consult
sufficiently with others in the company who may have had relevant experience, such as those involved in the
Jaguar safety case. BAE Systems accepted, with hindsight, that its planning could have been better. In my view,
it was a matter of foresight and common sense.
(7) BAE Systems’ Phase 1 work was superficial and inadequate.
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In my judgment, the way in which BAE Systems went about Phase 1 was superficial and inadequate.
No ‘analysis’ in Phase 1
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First, the ZHA carried out by BAE Systems at RAF Kinloss and RAF Waddington in Phase 1 included little, if any,
actual analysis on site. These visits constituted no more than general zonal inspections by the BAE Systems
teams. The process was simply one of ‘inspect and record’ with a view to recording potential hazards and taking
photographs as an aide memoire, as opposed to analysing, e.g., how systems might interact to cause a hazard.
Richard Oldfield described them in interview as an ‘identification exercise’ and said they involved no analysis.