The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

‘DILUTION’
Chapter 13 – Cuts, Change, Dilution and Distraction (1998-2006)
“When a 3-Star is interested in safety, everyone is interested in safety.”
(Junior RAF officer, 2009)
Dilution of airworthiness regime and culture (2000-2006)
Summary
13.115 In my view, a marked dilution of the airworthiness
regime and culture took place in the MOD during the
period 2000 to 2006. There was a steady erosion of focus on safety and airworthiness. The implementation
of the SDR and the 20% ‘Strategic Goal’ held centre stage.
13.116 It is clear that “continuous organisational change over an extended period” 39 had a deleterious effect on the
management of airworthiness. The period 2000 to 2006 was marked by three features so far as safety and
airworthiness in the MOD was concerned:-
(a) First, there was an inexorable shift from a ‘safety and airworthiness culture’ to a ‘business culture’
during this period in the MOD.
(b) Second, the organisational changes in the MOD led to a safety and airworthiness regime which was
organisationally complex, convoluted, confused and seemingly dysfunctional.
(c) Third, meanwhile, there was also a steady dismantling of some of the important features of the safety
and airworthiness regime which had previously existed.
(a) Shift from ‘safety and airworthiness’ to ‘business’ culture
13.117
In my view, there can be no doubt that the implementation of the 1998 SDR and ‘Strategic Goal’ brought
about a major shift in culture within the MOD from ‘safety and airworthiness’ to ‘business’. All the evidence
points to this being the case. Whereas in the 1990s there had been a strong focus on safety and airworthiness
issues, in the period 2000 to 2006, ‘business’ was increasingly paramount. I agree with George Baber’s
summary of the position in his evidence to the Review:
“I believe that as major organisational change occurred, with the formation of the DLO and
then subsequently as the DLO re-organised internally, then the balance between safety and
business-related decision-making shifted, with airworthiness becoming less prominent.
The consequence was to reduce the organisational oversight of IPT airworthiness systems,
processes and outcomes and to make it more difficult for the IPTLs to balance their business
responsibilities with those associated with safety.” 40
(b) Airworthiness structure became complex, convoluted, confused and seemingly
dysfunctional
13.118
As a result of the successive organisational changes, by 2005, the MOD’s airworthiness structure had become,
by its own admission, complex, convoluted and confused and seemingly dysfunctional.
MOD airworthiness regime was simpler and more coherent in 1990s
13.119
The airworthiness regime within the MOD used to be relatively simple, coherent and effective in the days
of the Chief Engineer RAF and RAF Logistics Command in the 1990s. The airworthiness regime established
during this period represents a high-water mark in my view.
39 George Baber’s written statement to the Review of 11 June 2009.
40 Ibid.
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