The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Chapter 21 – New Military Airworthiness Regime
authorities for the three Services. The Air Equipment Regulator is seeking to promote an initiative to implement
a military version of the UK Civil Airworthiness model and is leading a European forum attempting to achieve
similar convergence between European Armed Forces and Industry. The implementation of this model has
been difficult, however, with inefficiencies manifesting themselves at the interface between Forward and
Depth and roles and responsibilities not being widely understood. In my view, it is doubtful whether such
arrangements meet the needs of the Military that operate the equipment and carry the risks.
Independent MAA but part of MOD
21.15
21.16
Objective
21.17
In my view, it is important that the MAA is independent but remains part of the MOD. There is a logical
argument which can be made for the MAA to be entirely separate from the MOD so that it can provide a
totally independent voice untrammelled by financial or political pressures. Given the failings identified in this
Report, I see force in this argument.
However, the military element adds an entirely different dimension to the picture. The MOD has the
responsibility for delivering a certain military capability and balancing risk with task. A military organisation
must be ‘risk sensible’ but not too ‘risk averse’. The MAA must understand and appreciate operational
relevance and, importantly, be seen by military operators to understand and appreciate this, if it is to enjoy
their confidence. In my view, it would not be sensible or practicable to position the MAA legally and physically
outside the MOD. Sufficient independence will be assured by having: (a) the MAA working direct for 2nd PUS;
(b) a high-ranking 3-Star officer as Head of the MAA; (c) full time MAA Regulators who do not have other
potentially conflicting responsibilities, i.e. do not have responsibilities for delivery which give rise to potential
conflicts of interest; (d) clear Regulations which spell out different roles and responsibilities and assure the
MAA’s independence and immunity; and (e) stronger links with the CAA and HSE, including non-executives
from such organisations sitting on an MAA board with an express responsibility to watch for, and report
annually, on the MAA’s independence from financial, political and operational pressures.
The objective of Recommendations A is to establish as soon as practicable within the MOD a single,
independent, self-standing, autonomous, fully-functioning, co-located, tangible MAA which shall draw
together and regulate, on delegated authority from the Secretary of State for Defence, 9 all aspects of
Military Airworthiness, including the current regulatory roles of: (i) Equipment; (ii) Flight Operations; and (iii)
Airspace Management Regulators, and (iv) the three Service RTSAs. The mission of the MAA is to transform
Airworthiness management, transactional behaviour and culture across Defence. Unless senior 3-Star and
2-Star personnel are appointed to the posts of the Regulator (3-Star) and Technical/Operating Airworthiness
Regulators (2-Star) as recommended, the MAA will fail. Leadership is key.
Recommendations A
21.18
In order to achieve this objective, I make the following Recommendations:
Recommendation 21.A.1: A Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA) shall be established as soon as
practicable which comprises the single regulator authority responsible for regulating all aspects of
Airworthiness across the three Services and DE&S and reporting direct to 2 nd PUS. 10 The MAA shall
subsume all the roles and responsibilities currently undertaken by ACAS and by: (i) the Equipment
(Dir Air Systems and the MAR); (ii) Flight Operations (DARS); and (ii) Airspace Management (DAATM)
Regulators and the three Services RTSAs.
9 Military Aviation is regulated by a mix of enabling statute and Crown or Defence Prerogative. Regulation of the Royal Navy and Army are entirely
matters of prerogative with the power of the Defence Council to make Regulations set out in the Letters Patent. In the case of the Royal Air Force, the
statutory basis for making regulations is section 2 of the Air Force (Constitution) Act 1917 with the role of the Air Council replaced by the Defence
Council under the Defence Transfer of Functions Act 1964. The recommendations regarding the new airworthiness regime in this Report do not
require statutory amendments. However, if in the course of implementation, the new Head of the MAA requires any statutory power I understand
there is an opportunity to effect this in the Armed Forces Bill leading to the new 2011 Act.
10 This would reflect current arrangements for the management of Nuclear Safety.
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