The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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subsequently transpired, however, that much more detailed analysis was required i.e. to assess and to mitigate
the hazards in the light of any documentary evidence found. This resulted in a clash of approach between the
Mechanical Systems Department (Mech Systems) and the Airworthiness Department. 30 The man-hour estimates
originally provided for Phase 2 proved to be inadequate by a considerable margin. Mech Systems, in particular,
under-estimated the man-hours required by 610 hours. This, in turn, put pressure on resources. The situation
would have been different if (a) a proper scope of work had been drawn up and agreed with each relevant
specialist department, in order to ensure that everyone involved understood what was required from the outset
and that adequate resources could be, and were, allocated to the project at all stages; and (b) clear written
instructions had been given to each of the specialist departments by the Airworthiness Department, setting out
what steps they were required to take, and suitable ‘Pro-Formas’ drawn up and agreed at an early stage. None
of these things were done.
It should be noted that, at an early stage, both the BAE Systems Airworthiness Department and the Systems
Departments expressed concern as to whether sufficient resources were available for the NSC. 31 The problem
became more significant once it was realised that the archives contained much less available mitigating evidence
than BAE Systems and Chris Lowe expected. There was also a lack of available suitably qualified personnel
to carry out the analysis within the Systems Departments, in particular, in Electrical Systems. As explained in
Chapter 10A and further below, this led to delays and increasing time pressures in completing the project.
(9) BAE Systems’ personnel and task management of Phase 2 was poor and there were
personality clashes which led to further delays.
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In my judgment, BAE Systems’ personnel and task management of Phase 2 itself was poor.
Lack of management guidance
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There was a lack of guidance from BAE Systems’ management for BAE Systems’ staff in relation to how the
requisite hazard ‘identification’, ‘assessment’ and ‘mitigation’ processes should be carried out, and what the
Pro-Formas should contain. It was the management’s job to set the tasks and give appropriate guidance to the
staff as to how to go about it. When Witness K [BAE Systems] sought to obtain further guidance or query the
validity or value of a suggested approach, his questions were ‘swatted away’ on more than one occasion by
the Airworthiness Department which seemed intent on completing the project, in whatever fashion, within the
required timeframe.
Personality clash
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The contemporaneous exchanges and notes of meetings, in particular, the notebooks of Witness K [BAE Systems],
reveal that there were significant tensions between the Airworthiness and Systems Departments. In particular,
there was a significant clash of personalities between Chris Lowe and Witness K [BAE Systems], a fact confirmed
by a number of the other BAE Systems witnesses who gave evidence to the Review. Chris Lowe was a Grade 4
Executive and more senior than Witness K [BAE Systems], a Grade E engineering desk level practitioner. Witness
K [BAE Systems] was struggling, understandably in my view, to identify just what it was that the Airworthiness
Department required the Specialist Departments to do given the lacunae which he had discovered in the archives
by way of useful ‘mitigating’ evidence. The task was clearly not going to be as simple as originally envisaged.
Both he and Mech Systems were unsure how best to go about addressing the hazards, or precisely what form
the Pro-Formas should take. He rightly looked to Chris Lowe, as the Head of the Airworthiness Department, for
guidance on his proposals. But Chris Lowe clearly regarded Witness K [BAE Systems]’s repeated questions as a
source of irritation and, instead of engaging in a dialogue and discussion with him on the way forward, tended
to respond in a somewhat overbearing and dismissive manner. As Witness P [BAE Systems] explained in interview,
“toys were definitely thrown out of the cot”, and it was often a case of “Chris’ way or no way”. It is clear that
Chris Lowe did not easily brook dissent and tended to retreat into his shell when confronted, rather than properly
managing professional disagreements with more junior employees.
30 Otherwise known as Safety and Certification Department.
31 See, e.g., Chapter 10A, paragraph 10A.38.