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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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10B.31<br />

Bronze Award<br />

10B.32<br />

Chapter 10B – <strong>Nimrod</strong> Safety Case: <strong>The</strong> Facts (Third Phase)<br />

completed. <strong>The</strong> minutes then record that George Baber formally thanked BAE Systems for producing the<br />

Safety Case and Hazard Log and the meeting decided: “Nim(ES)Safety would produce a document and<br />

a suitable date for the IPTL to sign off the Safety Case Report for both the air vehicle and the mission<br />

system”.<br />

It is fair to say that the other <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT representatives present were probably relying on Frank Walsh to tell<br />

them if there were any problems with the NSC Reports produced by BAE Systems. His Annexes A and B to<br />

the Agenda, however, merely referred to a handful of hazards needing to be dealt with.<br />

5 Following the meeting of the Sixth PSWG, BAE Systems congratulated itself on a ‘job well done.’ In due course,<br />

the NSC project was nominated for the BAE Systems’ Chairman’s Award and the Airworthiness Department<br />

ultimately received a Bronze Award. In the Award nomination form and Chris Lowe’s presentation in support<br />

of the Award, he (Chris Lowe) expressly relied (amongst other things) on the fact that: (1) BAE Systems had<br />

used “highly experienced teams” of personnel; (2) that there had been a “timely performance of tasks”; (3)<br />

the project had been completed in partnership with the IPT and had therefore “engendered trust to allow<br />

[the] IPT to contract us for continued safety management activities”; and that there had been (4)“no surprises<br />

or showstoppers at the final acceptance conference”. On the back of the apparent success of the NSC, in<br />

December 2004, Chris Lowe made a sales pitch to the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT to prepare ‘Operational’ Safety Cases.<br />

19 November 2004: QinetiQ support ‘sign off’ of BLSC<br />

10B.33<br />

10B.34<br />

As regards the other attendees at the Sixth PSWG, there is no evidence that QinetiQ had either seen or read<br />

any of the six Reports in the meantime, let alone checked the BLSC Reports. Nonetheless, at the Task <strong>Review</strong><br />

Meeting on 19 November 2004, attended by representatives of the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT, including Frank Walsh,<br />

Martyn Mahy presented the Situation Report that he had previously prepared. <strong>The</strong> minutes record in terms:<br />

“QQ (Mr Mahy) reported that QQ were now ready to sign off the BLSC...”. In the Task <strong>Review</strong> Summary on<br />

the Safety Management System the following entry is recorded:<br />

“1. CASSANDRA.<br />

QinetiQ attended the <strong>Nimrod</strong> BLSC <strong>Review</strong> at BAE Systems Aug 04 and are happy with<br />

CASSANDRA and support the sign-off of the Baseline Safety Case.<br />

NIM(ES)Safety confirms remaining 10-15% of safety mitigation has been entered into the<br />

CASSANDRA…”<br />

It is not clear where Frank Walsh got the 10-15% figure from. It tallies, however, with Witness O [QinetiQ]’s<br />

evidence that he was told at the conference that 85-90% of the mitigation had been completed.<br />

10B.35 Martyn Mahy admitted in evidence to the <strong>Review</strong> that there was some disquiet ( “mutterings”) at the meeting<br />

by other QinetiQ representatives present as to whether QinetiQ was in a position to support the sign off the<br />

NSC. He recalls the QinetiQ Project Manager, Witness M [QinetiQ], saying: “Have we seen the reports yet?”;<br />

to which the answer was: “No, we still haven’t received the reports”. It appears, however, that the QinetiQ<br />

representatives present, who numbered more than a dozen, including the QinetiQ Technical Assurance<br />

Manager and also the Design Approved Organisations Scheme (DAOS) signatory, Colin Blagrove, were content<br />

to assent to the statement of Martyn Mahy that “QQ were now ready to sign off the BLSC...”, or at least did<br />

not raise an objection or demur. <strong>The</strong> minutes record the next item as being Colin Blagrove simply going on<br />

to referring to QinetiQ having introduced a new policy of “Independent Safety Case <strong>Review</strong>” which he said<br />

“should ensure that their reports met the IPT’s requirements, without detailing unnecessary requirements.”<br />

5 See, for example, the minutes of the TTRO <strong>Nimrod</strong> MR2 & R Engineering Integration Meeting held on 11 November 2004, section 3.2: “Baseline<br />

Safety Case – Now complete and delivered – the closure meeting successfully resulted in recommendation for payment and the results were then<br />

presented to a further audience with the Group Captain for <strong>Nimrod</strong> commenting on an excellent piece of work.”<br />

247

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