The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Chapter 13 – Cuts, Change, Dilution and Distraction (1998-2006)
became the paramount focus of their time and attention, at the expense of safety and airworthiness
matters such as the Nimrod Safety Case. The weakening of the airworthiness regime meant that
there were insufficient checks and balances and less oversight of the Nimrod IPT than was required
in all the circumstances during this period.
Responsibility
17. Two very senior figures bear particular responsibility for the episode of cuts, change, dilution and
distraction and its consequences outlined above, and are the subject of significant criticism in their
roles as Chief of Defence Logistics (CDL) during the key periods:
General Sir Sam Cowan (CDL from 1 April 1999 to 31 August 2002)
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger (CDL from 2 September 2002 to 31 December 2004)
Conclusion
18. Airworthiness in the MOD became a casualty of the process of cuts, change, dilution and distraction
commenced by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review.
Introduction
NART Concerns about Nimrod fleet in 1998
13.1
By 1998, the Nimrods were nearly 30 years old and getting closer to their Out-of-Service Dates (OSD). The
planned OSD for the MR2 was 2006, by which time it was to be replaced by the MRA4. The planned OSD
for the R1 was 2009.
NART Report 24 July 1998
13.2
13.3
In 1997, as part of an ongoing Airworthiness Review programme, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS)
and Air Member for Logistics (AML) tasked the Inspectorate of Flight Safety to carry out a review of the
Nimrod fleet. The review was duly conducted by the Nimrod Airworthiness Review Team (NART) which was
instructed “to conduct a wide ranging independent review of all in-service marks of the Nimrod aircraft to
assess the integrity of the airworthiness management and maintenance practices in place or proposed; the
currently planned out-of service date for the MR-Mk2 is 2006 and 2009 for the R-Mk 1”.
NART delivered its report on 24 July 1998. It expressed real concerns about ensuring the future airworthiness
of the Nimrod fleet:
13.3.1 Page 13 of the Executive Summary stated:
“The Review’s findings endorse those of various [Flight Safety] surveys and visits to RAF Kinloss
over the past 2 years and highlight low manning levels, declining experience, failing moral and
perceived overstretch generally as the driving concerns that impact directly on the MR Mk2
force’s ability to meet its operational task safely. Overall, the MPA Force is attempting to sustain
historical levels of activity with far fewer personnel and a smaller proportion of serviceable ac,
i.e. there is a large element of continuously trying to get ‘a quart out of a pint pot’, with all the
attendant hazards that such a scenario presents to safe ac operations.” (emphasis added)
13.3.2 Page 30 of the Executive Summary stated:
“The majority of the [Nimrod Airworthiness Review Team]’s other airworthiness concerns and
observations… tended to be linked to one central theme, i.e., the conflict between ever-reducing
resources and stable, or in some cases, increasing demands; whether they be operational,
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