The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
Introduction
25.1
25.2
25.3
25.4
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The relationship between the Defence Establishment and Industry is inevitably complex, sophisticated, incestuous,
and elliptical. It is also a very necessary and valuable relationship, not least because of the need to design,
develop, build, test and maintain increasingly high-technology and high-cost weaponry.
In the past decades, huge advantages have flowed from the ever-increasing role that Industry has played, and
continues to play, in supporting Defence; including financial, logistical, capability, and technological benefits.
Fashioning and managing the right relationship with Industry is necessarily a difficult and complex exercise
for those in the Defence Establishment, and vice-versa. It is made more difficult by different cultures, different
mores, different motivations, and different rewards. Furthermore, the current ‘Decider/Provider’ model is often
easier to enunciate than to put into effective practice (and suffers from the weakness that Deciders who have
no experience of being Providers are at a disadvantage).
Military forces around the world are grappling with the same Industry issues.
‘Partnership’ with Industry
25.5
It is against this backdrop that I point to some of the lessons of the Nimrod Safety Case (NSC) and findings of
the Review generally, which reveal worrying problems with the so-called ‘partnership’ between the MOD and
Industry, and the way in which the various organisations work together (see especially Chapters 10A and 10B,
11 and 19). I briefly highlight some of these concerns below.
All three organisations failed in Nimrod Safety Case 1
25.6
There was a collective failure of the three organisations concerned to deal with the NSC properly, and an
elemental failure by each of them to fulfil their individual roles vis-à-vis each other in satisfactory manner:
25.6.1 BAE Systems failed to act properly as an ‘approved organisation’. It failed to carry out the NSC task
in a careful, competent or thorough manner. It failed to deal with the customer, the Nimrod IPT, in
an open, candid, and straightforward way. Its conduct when handing over the NSC can fairly be
described as cynical.
25.6.2 QinetiQ failed to act as a careful, competent or thorough ‘independent check’ of any sort. It was for
much of the time essentially a passenger during the process. It was ultimately prepared to take the
line of least resistance. Its conduct can fairly be described as supine.
25.6.3 The Nimrod IPT failed at any stage to act as an ‘intelligent customer’. It outsourced its thinking. It was
at material times unquestioning, weak, and sloppy.
Flaws in bilateral and triangular relationships
25.7 The story of the NSC reveals flaws and fissures in the relationships of the parties inter se:
25.7.1 The bilateral relationship between BAE Systems and the Nimrod IPT: this was far from an equal
‘partnership’, with the former realising that it was unlikely to face much questioning of its work from
the latter; the particular relationship between the key personnel at BAE Systems and the Nimrod IPT
Safety Officer in charge of project managing the NSC task was altogether too cosy and informal.
25.7.2 The bilateral relationship between the Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ: the Nimrod IPT was suspicious that
QinetiQ was just ‘touting for business’ and QinetiQ was keen not to do anything that might upset its
customer.
25.7.3 The triangular relationship between BAE Systems, the Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ: the former two clearly
found the presence of the latter an unnecessary irritation and/or competition. As one contemporary
observer said: “it was obvious to me that QinetiQ was not seen as a partner in ensuring the aircraft