The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
(2) QinetiQ failed to check that BAE Systems sentenced risks in an appropriate manner
using appropriate data.
11.283 In my judgment, QinetiQ failed to take adequate steps to ensure or check that BAE Systems sentenced risks in
an appropriate manner using appropriate data.
11.284 As ‘independent advisor’ in relation to the NSC, QinetiQ should have taken steps to satisfy itself as to the
following matters: (1) that BAE Systems only used appropriate mitigating evidence to sentence hazards; (2) that
BAE Systems did not use MRA4 data to sentence MR2 and R1 hazards (which Chris Lowe had eschewed at
the first ‘Inaugural’ PSWG Meeting on 18 March 2002); (3) that BAE Systems used quantitative and qualitative
mitigation evidence appropriately to sentence hazards; (4) that the ‘checklist’ (which BAE Systems had referred
to at the ‘scoping’ meeting at Chadderton on 19 May 2003) was appropriate and was in fact used to sentence
hazards, (5) that the final BAE Systems’ BLSC report(s) included a statement that ‘past reliabilities data’ would
not demonstrate future reliability (which Witness L [QinetiQ] insisted on at the ‘scoping’ meeting on 19 May
2003); and (6) that mitigating evidence in fact used in the NSC reports reflected these points appropriately. As it
was, QinetiQ failed to take any steps to ensure that such advice that it did give in relation to these matters was
properly followed through.
(3) QinetiQ failed to check that BAE Systems included risk mitigation evidence in the
BLSC Reports.
11.285 In my judgment, QinetiQ failed to take adequate steps to ensure or check that all risk mitigation evidence was,
in fact, properly included by BAE Systems in the final NSC Reports.
11.286 As explained in Chapter 10A, Martyn Mahy had insisted in an e-mail to the Nimrod IPT dated 24 June 2004,
as a pre-condition to supporting the sign-off of the BLSC Reports, that “...all the risk mitigation evidence is
included in the final safety case report”. It appears, however, that QinetiQ failed to take any steps to satisfy itself
that this was in fact the case before it supported the sign-off (see further below).
(4) QinetiQ failed to advise the Nimrod IPT properly at the Customer Acceptance
Conference, failed to ask intelligent questions, and succumbed to pressure to be
party to a ‘consensus’ that BAE Systems had completed the NSC task.
11.287 In my judgment, QinetiQ failed to advise the Nimrod IPT properly, or protect the Nimrod IPT’s interests, at the
Customer Acceptance Conference, failed to ask intelligent questions, and succumbed to pressure to be party
to a ‘consensus’ that the BAE Systems had completed the NSC task. QinetiQ allowed the Nimrod IPT to agree
that BAE Systems had properly completed the NSC task when QinetiQ did not have a proper basis for assuming
this was the case.
QinetiQ sent an ill-prepared representative to Customer Acceptance Conference
11.288 The purpose of the Customer Acceptance Conference at Chadderton on 31 August and 1 September 2004
was for BAE Systems to present the results of Phase 2 of the NSC and to demonstrate to the satisfaction of
the Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ that the contractual requirements of PDS Task 06-3409 had been satisfied. It was,
therefore, an important meeting. QinetiQ sent Witness O [QinetiQ] to the meeting because Martyn Mahy was
unfortunately unavailable at the last moment. Witness O [QinetiQ] had no familiarity with the NSC, had not
been properly briefed, and had insufficient time to familiarise himself with the relevant issues. In my judgment,
he was ill-prepared for the meeting and it was inappropriate for QinetiQ to have sent him.
BAE Systems Presentations
11.289 The nature of the presentations given by BAE Systems and what transpired at the meeting are set out in detail
above and in Chapter 10A. For present purposes, it is important to remember that BAE Systems did not hand
out copies of the six deliverable reports at the meeting, did not draw attention to the fact that it had left
over 40% of the hazards “Open” and over 30% “Unclassified” (many with only vague recommendations) and
represented that the NSC task had been completed.
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