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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />

10A.135<br />

220<br />

Witness K [BAE Systems] was asked in interview about this entry in his notebook. He explained these were<br />

his personal thoughts at the time and said:<br />

“Witness K [BAE Systems]: I think the notes are pretty conclusive, aren’t they? <strong>The</strong>y say<br />

what I was thinking at the time.”<br />

10A.136 When asked why he wrote this note, he explained that the statement in the Weekly News simply “didn’t<br />

compute”. He said “I don’t see how somebody could make that statement, knowing where we were up to.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> answer to the question posed at the end of his manuscript note, “How did Gp Capt Baber come to the<br />

conclusion that we were on program to finish by July?” was obvious: George Baber had been reassured by<br />

Chris Lowe.<br />

24 May 2004: delays causing further tensions at BAE Systems’ Design <strong>Review</strong> meetings<br />

10A.137 An internal BAE Systems Design <strong>Review</strong> meeting took place a couple of days later on 24 May 2004. <strong>The</strong><br />

minutes show just how far behind BAE Systems was in the project. Some 104 hazards were “on the street”<br />

but only eight had been returned, i.e. less than 10%. This was after nearly four months, with only two<br />

months remaining. Witness K [BAE Systems] and Mech Systems had completed only four of the 20 functional<br />

hazards and none of the 33 zonal hazards. A week had been lost in Mech Systems due to other projects.<br />

Witness G [BAE Systems] and Structures had completed four out of 12 mitigations. <strong>The</strong>re had still not been<br />

any input from Electrical Systems in relation to its 34 hazards because of resource problems. It was decided<br />

that Eric Prince would arrange electrical cover from Woodford and that Mech Systems would be given further<br />

resources. <strong>The</strong> archives were described as containing “holes in the mitigation audit”.<br />

10A.138 Witness K [BAE Systems]’s notes of the meeting show the considerable tensions present at this time. Chris<br />

Lowe insisted, in uncompromising terms, that the project had to be finished on time and took Mech Systems<br />

to task for not getting on with the job. <strong>The</strong> notes record Chris Lowe saying “[Group Captain Baber] is ordering<br />

the sandwiches for the [completion] meeting already”, the project was “high profile” and “cannot afford to<br />

fail”. He said Witness K [BAE Systems] “cannot cope” and “needed more resources”. He told Witness K [BAE<br />

Systems] that he needed “to get a move on” and he should send fewer e-mails and correspondence. Chris<br />

Lowe denied in interview that he had said some of these things; but I am satisfied that the contemporaneous<br />

manuscript note is an accurate record of what was said at the meeting. Witness K [BAE Systems]’s considerable<br />

anger at being carpeted in this way by Chris Lowe is apparent from a colourful disparaging acronym he wrote<br />

in his notes. As Witness K [BAE Systems] admitted in interview, he was “not happy” at his treatment at the<br />

hands of Chris Lowe. This was a considerable understatement. <strong>The</strong>re was clearly a major clash of personalities<br />

between him and Chris Lowe. Witness K [BAE Systems] saw himself (with some justification) as going about<br />

things in a careful and meticulous way. Chris Lowe, on the other hand, was senior to him and the dominant<br />

character in the BAE Systems team, and did not take kindly to what he saw as Witness K [BAE Systems]’s<br />

obstructive and finicky approach to the task. But rather than discussing a way forward, in particular on the<br />

question of agreeing a model zonal Pro-Forma, Chris Lowe was inclined to “throw his toys out of the cot”<br />

as one former BAE Systems’ employee put it. <strong>The</strong>re was a lack of management grip at the time able to sort<br />

out this impasse.<br />

25 May 2004: man-hours spend over budget<br />

10A.139 On 25 May 2004, Witness K [BAE Systems] sent Eric Prince a breakdown of his hours spent. <strong>The</strong>se totalled 226<br />

hours to date. He calculated that it would take another 418 hours to complete the remaining 19 Functional<br />

Pro-Formas (at an average of 22 hours each). This would use up most of the 650 hours budgeted for Mech<br />

Systems (226 + 418 = 644 hours). Accordingly, the vast majority of the time taken to complete the (33) Zonal<br />

Pro-Formas would be outside the budget.

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