The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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referred to some sort of ‘handover’ ceremony. It was clearly a candid reference as to how BAE Systems viewed
the prospect of being able to trumpet the first proper, large aircraft, safety case: it would lead to further work
(and cash) rolling in.
18 May 2004: first ‘milestone’ payment authorised
10A.145 On the next day, 18 June 2004, Frank Walsh formally authorised the milestone payment stating that in
some areas BAE Systems had completed “more of the task than expected as this point”. This may have been
generous given the Fire & Explosion Report had not been completed as required by the original Gantt Chart68 and, indeed, it had not even been started by 7 July 2004. Chris Lowe e-mailed his team inviting them for
celebratory drinks. He pointed out that the project was “extremely challenging” but “very important” to the
Nimrod IPT and one in which George Baber had “a very keen interest”.
QinetiQ “quite satisfied” with work so far done
10A.146
Martyn Mahy’s impressions of the meeting were recorded in an e-mail dated 24 June 2004 to Frank Walsh
and others (which were also repeated to the QinetiQ Task Review Meeting on 16 July 2004):
“I visited BAE Chadderton on 17th June to review the nearly completed BSC for Nimrod R1
and MR2 aircraft. Chris Lowe gave me a presentation of the work performed so far, which
included a look at some reports, e.g. ZHA and HazMat reports and an examination of the
CASSANDRA database. I was quite satisfied with the work done so far and the approach
taken. The CASSANDRA database correctly identifies accidents, hazards, controls, hazard
probabilities & accident severity. It contains many live hyperlinks to BAE documents,
including photographs of the Zones analysed in the ZHA. Due to the plethora of hyperlinks
to documents on the BAE Chadderton computer network, the CASSANDRA database will
not be protable [sic] and will have to remain on the Chadderton site.
Providing all the risk mitigation evidence is included in the final safety case report, I don’t
foresee any difficulties supporting the DPA in the sign-off of the baseline safety case.”
(emphasis added)
10A.147 Martyn Mahy suggested in evidence to the Review that what he meant by his latter requirement that “all
mitigation evidence is included in the final safety case report” was merely that there had to be links to the
supporting evidence in CASSANDRA and any deficiencies highlighted in the NSC Report itself. I do not accept
this. In my view, he meant what he said at the time, namely, that all relevant mitigating evidence had to be
included in the final NSC Report and, therefore, available for examination and checking when it came to
be reviewed. He had been shown examples of Pro-Formas during this meeting and was indicating that he
expected to see the full set included in the final Safety Case Report.
QinetiQ confirm “don’t foresee any difficulties” in supporting eventual sign-off
10A.148 Subsequently, at a QinetiQ TRM on 16 July 2004, Martyn Mahy’s impressions of the meeting of 17 June 2004
as expressed at the end of his e-mail of 24 June 2004 were formally relayed to the Nimrod IPT. The annex to
the minutes records:
“QinetiQ satisfied with the work done so far and the approach taken. Providing all the
risk mitigation evidence is included in the final safety case report, QQ does foresee any
difficulties in supporting the DPA in the sign-off of the baseline safety case.” (emphasis
added).
68 In my view, the reference in the Gantt Chart to “complete fire/explosion risk analysis/survey” (emphasis added) by end February 2004 (first
milestone) is a reference to the completion of a Fire & Explosion report.