The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Chapter 11 – Nimrod Safety Case: Analysis and Criticisms
11.307 I am satisfied that this was a failure of foresight, not hindsight, by the individuals concerned (see further
below).
Colin Blagrove
11.308 Colin Blagrove was the relevant Technical Assurance Manager responsible for the technical integrity of the NSC.
He was also the Design Approved Organisations Scheme (DAOS) signatory. As he admitted when asked about
his role in interview, it was his personal responsibility as DAOS signatory to ensure that QinetiQ did not sign-off
on matters unless there was adequate evidence to justify it:
“MR HADDON-CAVE QC: Finally, [Mr Blagrove], I’m bound to ask this, I am afraid.
Whose responsibility was it to ensure that Martin Mahy did not sign up QinetiQ to things
which QinetiQ should not have been signed up to? Was it [the Technical Manager’s]
responsibility or your responsibility or both your responsibilities?
MR BLAGROVE: Yes. I understand the question. I think my answer, though -- and
I don’t want to sound obtuse -- but it is that for a safety specialist to offer advice to
a customer, they should get formal approval. I would probably want to see something
written down with supporting evidence, and it would be signed off by a DAOS signatory.
Somebody like myself.
In the case of a statement about, “We support the sign-off”, you can’t stop people
explaining things and expressing things to the customers. I think that’s healthy. But to
have them accept that as something formal that we have delivered is misconstruing it.
So I think in the case of: whose responsibility was it for sign-off? The question is: well,
we weren’t being asked to sign anything off. So I think the question in my mind doesn’t
indeed arise.
MR PARSONS QC: But you were being asked to sign off. Whose responsibility was it to
ensure that you don’t unless you had adequate evidence?
MR BLAGROVE: The DAOS signatory. The technical information would be a DAOS -- we
have used the term “technical assurance manager”.
MR PARSONS QC: So that would be you?
MR BLAGROVE: Yes.
MR PARSONS: What would [the Technical Manager’s] responsibility be in those
circumstances?
MR BLAGROVE: To provide the specialist advice into that process.”
‘Sign-off’ means ‘sign-off’
11.309 A number of the QinetiQ witnesses, including Colin Blagrove, equivocated about the meaning of ‘sign-off’. This
was not edifying. In my view, ‘sign-off’ means what it says: the actual or notional signature on a document or
piece of work to signify approval by the signatory of that document or piece of work. It matters not that there
was no actual physical signature placed on the BLSC Reports by Colin Blagrove as the relevant QinetiQ DAOS
signatory present. The fact is that he was the senior ‘assurance’ person present at the Task Review Meeting
on 19 November 2004 at which the Task Manger had said “QQ were now ready to sign off the BLSC...”; and
despite “mutterings” by some of the other QinetiQ representatives present and the Project Manager, Witness M
[QinetiQ] saying, “Have we seen the reports yet?”, to which the answer was “No”, Colin Blagrove was prepared
to let the matter to go through on the nod (see Chapter 10B). He should not have done so.
I am satisfied, that at the Task Review Meeting on 19 November 2009 (see
11.310 Chapter 10B) by actions of Martyn
Mahy and assent of Colin Blagrove, QinetiQ, in effect, put its name to the BLSC Reports in an unqualified
manner and, therefore, gave its blessing to both the substance and form of the NSC. This allowed the ISA role,
de facto, to be fulfilled regarding the sign off of the NSC.
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