The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Chapter 11 – Nimrod Safety Case: Analysis and Criticisms
up most of the time negotiating the second Nimrod Integrated Support Contract (NISC 2) with BAE Systems
and simply “didn’t have the time to be hands on” in relation to the NSC. Sixth, the NSC is symptomatic of a
widespread malaise of the ‘tick box’ mentality, whereby reports are outsourced to consultants and, on receipt,
simply put in a drawer without being read or checked, and the relevant box ticked.
11.212 It must also be remembered that the Pro-Formas under-pinning the NSC were not readily available to the
Nimrod IPT (or QinetiQ) at the time that the six NSC reports were delivered to them, as they were only accessible
from the BAE Systems terminal at Chadderton. This, however, does not excuse the failure of George Baber,
Michael Eagles and Frank Walsh to call for the production of any of the mitigating evidence behind the NSC
Reports produced by BAES, or to ensure that such evidence was carefully checked by the relevant Nimrod IPT
engineering specialists, Heads of Branch and QinetiQ as the Nimrod IPT’s independent advisor in relation to the
project. Had they done so, I have no doubt that they would have uncovered that the Pro-Formas prepared by
BAE Systems included numerous errors of fact and analysis, including the Pro-Forma in relation to Hazard H73.
(6) The Nimrod IPT subsequently signed off BAE Systems’ NSC task in circumstances
where it was inappropriate to do so.
11.213 In my judgment, the Nimrod IPT subsequently signed off BAE Systems’ NSC task in circumstances where it was
inappropriate to do so. The formal sign-off followed the Sixth PSWG meeting on 10 November 2004, where the
Nimrod IPT’s earlier lack of activity was repeated.
Sixth PSWG meeting on 10 November 2004
11.214 On 10 November 2004, George Baber chaired the Sixth PSWG meeting at RAF Wyton. On behalf of BAE
Systems, Chris Lowe and Richard Oldfield, gave a PowerPoint presentation regarding the BLSC in which he
said all foreseeable hazards had been “identified and assessed, and addressed... [and] eliminated or reduced to
[ALARP]..” and that “...where the existing level of mitigation against a hazard was determined as insufficient/
incomplete, the report conclusions contain recommendations”. There was also a brief demonstration by Witness
C [BAE Systems] of how the CASSANDRA Hazard Log worked.
11.215 Again, the BAE Systems’ representatives did not go into any relevant details as to how much of the Phase 2
project had been completed and what remained to be done, and did not volunteer precisely how many hazards
remained “Open” or “Unclassified”.
11.216 Again, the Nimrod IPT representatives present (including the IPTL, George Baber) were content to sit, passively,
and accept at face value the PowerPoint presentations by BAE Systems. They did not raise any queries in relation
to what was presented by BAE Systems or ask BAE Systems any of the intelligent questions which should have
been asked. Instead, George Baber simply thanked BAE Systems for its work in producing the Safety Case
Report and Hazard Log and Frank Walsh was tasked to produce a document and a suitable date for the IPTL
formally to ‘sign-off’ the NSC, which he formally did on 15 December 2004.
11.217 In his written submissions to the Review, George Baber sought to suggest that this was not the sort of meeting
where detailed questioning of BAE Systems on their work would have been ‘feasible or appropriate’ and it was
never intended that the NSC task would be formally accepted at the Sixth PSWG meeting “and indeed, it was
not”. This does not square, however, either with the minutes or with his letter of 15 December 2004 in which
he expressly referred to the fact of ‘acceptance’ of the NSC Reports ‘at’ the Sixth PSWG. Moreover, it would not
have required detailed questioning of BAE Systems to elicit that there was a large hole in its work. 115
115 George Baber’s suggestion that, whilst 43 “Open” hazards out of 105 is a high proportion, it is not a large proportion when compared with an
original total of “2,000 open hazards in Phase 1” betrays a misunderstanding of the Phase 2 rationalisation of hazards.
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