The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
10B.62
10B.63
254
Hazard H75:
Similarly, the historical data on CASSANDRA shows that, on 19 April 2004, Hazard H62 was
ascribed an “Initial Probability” of “Frequent” with a post probability of “Unclassified”. It was not given
a “Post Probability” on CASSANDRA of “Remote” until 3 February 2005, after BAE Systems received
Annex A from Frank Walsh.
In any event, the approach Frank Walsh took was inappropriate and illogical. It was inappropriate because
he chose to ignore BAE Systems’ recommendations in Annex C of the BLSC Phase 2 Report that the vast
majority of the 32 Unclassified” hazards needed “Further analytical techniques” or “further work” or “further
investigation” etc. simply in order to classify the hazards. He explained in interview with the Review that he
felt there was an element of BAE Systems simply asking for “more work and money”. But this may have
contained an element of ex post facto rationalisation. There is no evidence that he questioned BAE Systems
on this aspect, or discussed the approach he was proposing to take with them, or his superiors. He should,
at the very least, have done so. From this point onwards, it is unclear precisely: (a) how and why Frank
Walsh determined the presence of (non-existent) fire detection and suppression systems in many parts of the
aircraft; and (b) how and why he used that information to determine a probability assessment of “Remote”.
Again, these matters are not the subject of record or recollection. Attempts to divine any real logic to his
approach to sentencing these remaining hazards have not proved fruitful.
It is, moreover, clear that Annex A was a cut-and-paste job done in a hurry with little real thought given to
it. Frank Walsh did not, for instance, include the full zone description from Annex B to the BLSC Phase 2
of the zone in question, i.e. in relation to Hazard H73, Annex B to the BLSC Phase 2 read: “Zone 514/614
Interacting Systems Hazards – No. 7 Fuel Tank”. It is worth pointing out at this juncture that it is difficult to
see how BAE Systems could have expected the Nimrod IPT properly to sentence these hazards without seeing
BAE Systems’ Pro-Formas.
Annex A data input to CASSANDRA without being checked by BAE Systems
10B.64
10B.65
The information contained in Annex A was input to CASSANDRA following its receipt by BAE Systems,
i.e. the “Post Probability” control status for the relevant hazards was amended in accordance with Frank
Walsh’s column in Annex A. Witness C [BAE Systems] confirmed in interview that he mechanically typed
into CASSANDRA the information provided by Frank Walsh in Annex A without checking or considering
whether it was correct or not. He said there was no contractual requirement, as he saw it, for BAE Systems
to “second guess basically the operators of the aircraft and the owners of the aircraft.” On the basis of the
strict terms of the Proposal, this is correct. When questioned as to whether or not he queried the number of
zones apparently containing a fire detection and suppression system, his response was that, as a non-Nimrod
systems expert, it never occurred to him that this was odd and that “I did not consider it my job to double
check what the Air Force were telling me, with regard to their platform.” It is unfortunate that BAE Systems
did not see itself as having a wider remit, both as DA and manager of CASSANDRA, not to input nonsense.
It is clear that there were some subsequent exchanges between Witness C [BAE Systems] and Frank Walsh.
For instance, a copy of Frank Walsh’s letter of 1 February 2005 retained in Chris Lowe’s working papers, had
marked on it in manuscript by Witness C [BAE Systems] a number of amendments to Annex A, including
the correct reference for the Nimrod maintenance procedures and further details of the controls for Hazard
H42 (Human Factors). These amendments were noted following a telephone discussion conference with
Frank Walsh on 3 February 2005. The overall impression gained, from this and other similar documents, is
that Witness C [BAE Systems] was generally content merely to amend CASSANDRA in accordance with Frank
Walsh’s instructions.
22 February 2004: George Baber gives final approval for setting of CASSANRA hazards
10B.66
There is no record of any further discussion between either Frank Walsh and BAE Systems, or Frank Walsh
and George Baber until 22 February 2005, when a letter was sent from George Baber to BAE Systems,
HQSTC, RAF Waddington, RSAFW4 and Eng Pol AW3, giving final approval for the BLSC. The letter, which
was drafted by Frank Walsh and signed by George Baber, stated that the Nimrod IPT had “reviewed the