The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
13.188
13.189
Conclusion
13.190
400
Fifth, whilst it was inadvisable to give IPTLs the option to choose to be their own Project Engineer (PE) as
well as IPTL, it was standard practice at the time to give IPTLs who were themselves qualified aeronautical
engineers (such as George Baber) the option of being their own PEs. Further, it is difficult to criticise this
decision (other than with hindsight) given there was no indication that George Baber was not more capable
of fulfilling both roles; indeed, he was intelligent and energetic and would have appeared to be an eminently
suitable candidate to be ‘dual-hatted’.
There is a natural inherent tension between the functions of an IPTL, whose role is ‘delivery’ of the project,
on time and within budget, and that of a PE, whose role is ensuring best practice, safety and airworthiness.
Where an IPTL is also qualified to be the PE, there will be a natural tendency, for reasons of professional
pride, for him or her to elect to fill both roles, whether or not that decision is sensible in the light of other
leadership commitments at that stage of the project life cycle. I am aware that, currently, on some large
projects, the IPTLs have chosen not to fill both roles, but I believe that this decision is too important to be left
to the individual themselves.
In conclusion:
13.190.1 Airworthiness was a casualty of the process of cuts, change, dilution and distraction commenced
by the 1998 SDR.
13.190.2 Organisational pressures, weaknesses and failures were a significant cause of the loss of XV230.
13.190.3 These organisational failures were both failure of leadership and collective failures to keep safety
and airworthiness at the top of the agenda despite the seas of change during the period 1998 to
2006.