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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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1989: Mod 715 Installation Changes<br />

6.12<br />

6.13<br />

6.14<br />

Chapter 6 – Overflow or Pressure from Air-to-Air Refuelling<br />

In 1989 Mod 715 was introduced and the features developed as part of the AEW3 program were incorporated<br />

on the MR2. In particular, the restricted No. 5 tank refuel valve was introduced. This complicated the refuelling<br />

sequence as devised in 1987. To prevent longitudinal balance limits being breached, as No. 6 tank now filled<br />

faster than No. 5 tank, the air engineer had to switch the former’s refuel valve on and off. No. 7 tanks would<br />

reach full before the No. 1 tank and, therefore, on most occasions, the only refuel valves open near the end of<br />

an AAR serial would be the two on the No. 1 tank and that on the restricted No. 5 tank.<br />

<strong>The</strong> net effect of this was to increase substantially the instantaneous flow rate of fuel into the No. 1 tank during<br />

AAR.<br />

11 Formal trials were conducted to ascertain the functionality of the Mod 715 changes. However, the bowser<br />

used to provide fuel for the practical test of the AAR system was unable to deliver fuel at more than 30psi. <strong>The</strong><br />

trials team extrapolated figures to calculate fuel flows at 50psi. A direct result of this was that the opportunity<br />

possibly to observe No. 1 tank blow-off was lost. In their response to this suggestion, BAE Systems said that the<br />

above report12 showed the bowser pressure at 50psi for the last two minutes of the 25 minute trial and therefore<br />

that the opportunity to observe No. 1 tank blow-off was not lost. However, blow-off would be dependant on<br />

the higher rate of refuel at 50psi being present for the majority of the refuel to induce asymmetric filling of<br />

individual cells, which it was not in this case.<br />

1989: Introduction of the Tristar Tanker<br />

6.15<br />

6.16<br />

Until 1989, the <strong>Nimrod</strong> had refuelled primarily from the Victor and VC10, each with a single Hose Drum Unit<br />

(HDU) capable of delivering up to 1,800kg per minute. In 1990, the Tristar was converted to be a tanker aircraft<br />

and was cleared to refuel a variety of receivers, including the MR2. <strong>The</strong> Tristar’s twin HDUs each delivered fuel<br />

at a greater rate (2,100kg per minute) than its predecessors because of the addition of two hydraulically driven<br />

Carter pumps. Trials for the <strong>Nimrod</strong> to receive fuel from the Tristar were completed in 1989. A fuel flow rate of<br />

2,100kg per minute was achieved for the <strong>Nimrod</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> additional delivery capacity of the Tristar Carter pumps represented another potential increase in the<br />

individual tank refuel rates and increased further the potential for asymmetric filling of No. 1 tank.<br />

Cumulative effect of changes ignored<br />

6.17<br />

<strong>The</strong> combined effect of these changes was to increase the flow rates at certain stages of AAR, and particularly<br />

during Tristar AAR. As the BOI found, at no stage were the cumulative effects of successive changes to the<br />

<strong>Nimrod</strong> AAR capability understood and analysed. As the RAF Kinloss Station Commander put it, at no point was<br />

“a holistic view” taken of the incremental effect of the changes.<br />

2008: Prohibition of AAR on <strong>Nimrod</strong>s<br />

6.18<br />

A year after the loss of XV230, on 5 November 2007, <strong>Nimrod</strong> XV235 diverted into Kandahar airfield following<br />

a leak in the bomb bay which occurred during AAR. <strong>The</strong> leak had been observed by the crew through the<br />

periscope that is fitted to allow aircrew to survey the bomb bay area in flight. <strong>The</strong> leak could not be replicated<br />

on the ground, despite many attempts. As it was no longer possible to state that leaks which might occur during<br />

AAR would be detected on the ground, AAR on <strong>Nimrod</strong>s was prohibited by AOC 2 Gp and this has now been<br />

incorporated formally within the <strong>Nimrod</strong>’s Release to Service documentation.<br />

11 British Aerospace Report HAS-MPP-T-801-0273 “Ground Test of the Air to Air Refuelling System”, dated May 1988.<br />

12 Ibid, Figure 1 (footnote 7).<br />

111

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