The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

PART III: NIMROD SAFETY CASE
Introduction to PART III
1. Part III of this Report covers the Nimrod Safety Case.
Part III – Nimrod Safety Case
2. Safety Cases were mandated by regulations. The purpose of a Safety Case is to identify, assess and
mitigate potentially catastrophic hazards which might occur to an aircraft or other platform.
3. The Nimrod Safety Case was produced between 2001 and 2005, primarily by BAE Systems, with
involvement from the Nimrod Integrated Project Team and QinetiQ acting as ‘independent advisor’.
The Nimrod Safety Case comprised a series of reports and a hazard database on the Nimrod MR2
and R1 fleets.
4. Nimrod MR2 and R1 aircraft had, from their inception, contained inherent design flaws (see Part II
of this Report). These flaws should have been picked up by the Nimrod Safety Case. They were not.
The reasons why not are set out in Chapters 10A, 10B and 11.
5. The Nimrod Safety Case, in fact, represented the best opportunity to capture the serious design
flaws in the Nimrod MR2 and R1 that had lain dormant for the decades before the accident to
XV230.
6. A careful Safety Case would, and should, have highlighted the catastrophic risks to the Nimrod fleet
presented by the Cross-Feed/Supplementary Conditioning Pack duct and the Air-to-Air Refuelling
modification.
7. If the Nimrod Safety Case had been properly carried out, the loss of XV230 would have been
avoided.
8. Unfortunately, the Nimrod Safety Case was a lamentable job from start to finish. It was riddled
with errors. It missed the key dangers. Its production is a story of incompetence, complacency and
cynicism.
9. The best opportunity to prevent the accident to XV230 was, tragically, lost.
10. Part III has four Chapters:
Chapter 9: BACKGROUND TO SAFETY CASES
Chapter 10A and Chapter 10B: NIMROD SAFETY CASE: THE FACTS
Chapter 11: NIMROD SAFETY CASE: ANALYSIS AND CRITICISMS
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