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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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9.22<br />

9.23<br />

Chapter 9 – Background to Safety Cases<br />

cost” 38 and that a computation must be made in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the<br />

sacrifice, whether in time, money or trouble, involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk is placed in<br />

the other; and that, if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them, the risk being insignificant<br />

in relation to the sacrifice, then the person upon whom the duty is laid discharges the burden of proving that<br />

compliance was not reasonably practicable. 39<br />

<strong>The</strong> HSE has endorsed this test of ‘gross disproportion’, namely, that in any assessment as to whether risks have<br />

been reduced to ALARP, measures to reduce the risk can be ruled out only if the sacrifice involved in taking<br />

them would be grossly disproportionate to the benefits of the risk reduction. 40 <strong>The</strong> HSE summarises matters by<br />

stating:“Thus, determining that risks have been reduced ALARP involves an assessment of the risk to be avoided,<br />

of the sacrifice (in money, time and trouble) involved in taking measures to avoid that risk, and a comparison<br />

of the two.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> ‘R’ in ALARP thus has a financial, temporal and trouble component.<br />

Development of Safety Cases in the RAF<br />

Management Services (Organisation) Division Study (1994)<br />

9.24<br />

9.25<br />

9.26<br />

<strong>The</strong> requirement for Safety Cases within the MOD can be traced back to the Management Services (Organisation)<br />

Division Study No. 773 – Equipment Safety Assurance, dated March 1994 (Man S (Org) Study), which in large<br />

part grew out of the findings and conclusions of the Piper Alpha report.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Man S (Org) Study was sponsored by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Defence Procurement) (DUS(DP))<br />

and had a number of specific tasks which included: (1) examining the existing and planned arrangements for<br />

ensuring that equipment procured by the Procurement Executive (PE) for its customers was safe for use by<br />

reference to contemporary standards and legislative support; and (2) establishing whether such arrangements<br />

reflected latest thinking and best practice in safety and risk management and took account of statutory<br />

requirements and applicable MOD standards governing safety in Defence equipment. 41<br />

<strong>The</strong> Man (S) Org Study found that, in relation to procurement strategy, there were some concerns that safety<br />

was not addressed as a specific item requiring attention as part of the overall process. <strong>The</strong> central concerns<br />

related to the lack of visibility and accountability regarding equipment assurance and the lack of a coherent<br />

safety policy. <strong>The</strong>se concerns gave rise to the following recommendations (amongst others): 42<br />

9.26.1 That safety management should be addressed as part of the procurement strategy process.<br />

9.26.2 <strong>The</strong> establishment of a safety directorate to define policy, set standards, give advice and liaise with,<br />

for example, the HSE. <strong>The</strong> Man S (Org) Study shared Lord Cullen’s view that a ‘goal-setting’ approach<br />

should be adopted.<br />

9.26.3 <strong>The</strong> creation of a central safety management office and safety management board.<br />

9.26.4 <strong>The</strong> implementation of a Safety Case regime in the procurement process, its objective being “to provide<br />

a well organised and resourced justification of the acceptability of the System’s safety”. <strong>The</strong> Man (S)<br />

Org Study noted that the essential features of a Safety Case were that it must fully describe the system,<br />

identify the hazards, identify the risks and indicate the safeguards and describe the safety management<br />

system arrangements.<br />

9.26.5 <strong>The</strong> development of Def-Stan 00-56 to address the whole safety system (see further below).<br />

38 Per Tucker LJ, at page 710.<br />

39 Per Tucker LJ, at page 712. And see further the report of Adelard on “Numerical Criteria for Airworthiness” dated 30 September 2002, produced<br />

for ALTG.ADRP1 under contract MAP2b/1351.<br />

40 HSE Document“Principles and guidelines to assist HSE in its judgment that duty-holders have reduced risk as low as reasonably practicable”,<br />

paragraph 24.<br />

41 Man S (Org) Study, at pages A1-A2.<br />

42 See the Summary of Recommendations at page 85 of the Man S (Org) Study.<br />

169

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