The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

Delays resulted
11.51
Chapter 11 – Nimrod Safety Case: Analysis and Criticisms
The tension between Chris Lowe and Witness K [BAE Systems] is of far more than mere anecdotal interest.
As more than one BAE Systems witness explained to the Review, the relationship between Chris Lowe and
Witness K [BAE Systems] ultimately broke down altogether, effectively semi-paralysing the progress of the NSC
project for a period of some months between March and July 2004, leading to serious deadline pressures. It
took three to four months, from early April to 7 July, to achieve agreement between the Mech Systems and
Airworthiness Departments on the form of the zonal Pro-Forma. It is inevitable in any organisation that tensions
and professional differences between employees and departments will occur from time to time; but these
situations should be managed properly and resolved quickly and not allowed to fester and affect outputs,
particularly where safety is concerned. Chris Lowe admitted in interview that he found Witness K [BAE Systems]
‘irritating’ and they had ‘issues’ and differences, but denied a breakdown in relations. I am satisfied that this
clash of personalities between Chris Lowe and Witness K [BAE Systems] was a significant factor. It was not
managed properly or sorted out. It did affect the project and cause delay.
(10) BAE Systems’ promises as to completion were unreasonably optimistic.
11.52
In my judgment, BAE Systems’ promises to the Nimrod IPT as to when the task would be completed were
unreasonably optimistic. Chris Lowe should not have reported to the IPT and QinetiQ at the Fifth PSWG meeting
on 18 May 2004 that Phase 2 of the NSC was “considered to be progressing well” and that BAE Systems was
“highly confident that they will produce the Baseline reports as programmed (end July 2004)”. As Witness K
[BAE Systems] noted privately in his notebook, it is difficult to see how Chris Lowe could properly have made
this statement to the Fifth PSWG knowing as he did that:
(1) All hazards had still not yet been delivered to the Engineering Department (and should have been
supplied by the end of February);
(2) BAE Systems still did not have a practical way ahead on ZHAs;
(3) The Engineering Department had had a four month window reduced to one month to complete its
tasks;
(4) There were resource problems, particularly with Electrical Systems;
(5) Only about six to eight hazards out of 104 had been returned; and
(6) There remained a ‘high volume’ of work to be discharged.
11.53 Chris Lowe suggested that the progress report he gave to the Fifth PSWG meeting was ‘ not an unreasonable
one’. I disagree. He should not have made this statement to the client knowing what he did. It resulted in further
pressure in the months to come.
(11) BAE Systems’ management exerted unreasonable pressure on its personnel to
meet the deadline and the final Phase 2 work was increasingly rushed and corners
were cut.
11.54
In my judgment, there can be no doubt that Phase 2 became delayed and BAE Systems ran seriously short of
time to meet the end of August deadline for completion, with the consequence that corners were cut. This
was largely due to its failure properly to plan and manage the project in the first place. In the later stages, BAE
Systems’ management brought pressure to bear on its personnel to finish the task. I have concluded that, as a
result, BAE Systems’ work on Phase 2 of the NSC was increasingly rushed and quality inevitably suffered.
Delays and ‘Final push’
11.55
By 7 July 2004, only 41 out of 104 hazards had been returned and 63 remained to be completed. Mech Systems
had only completed 20% of its work. In order to speed matters along, BAE Systems then resorted to using
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