The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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AD(Eng)Pol
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Following publication of the Turnbull Report in 1999, which focused on governance and internal controls,
this airworthiness audit and assurance function was broadened to embrace also a ‘corporate governance’
approach, leading to some dilution.
Group Captain Eng Pol/AD(Eng)Pol had a variety of roles in relation to developing engineering policy and
supporting IPTs in particular in relation to airworthiness. AD(Eng)Pol’s main responsibilities were: (a) developing
and publishing RAF-wide engineering policy; (b) the subsequent migration of single-Service policy and
documentation into a common standard for use across Defence (i.e. JAP); (c) liaising with ADRP regarding
the development of JSP553; and (d) reviewing IPTLs for airworthiness standards. On the policy side, AD(Eng)
Pol had seven or eight staff. On the airworthiness side, AD(Eng)Pol was assisted by three staff: a Wing
Commander, a Major and a Flight Lieutenant. The Major advised IPTs about the GARP42 process and Safety
Cases, although IPTs were expected to recruit and train their own Safety Case specialists.
Inspectorate of Flight Safety (RAF)
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The Inspectorate of Flight Safety RAF (IFS(RAF)) was an independent Directorate headed by a 1-Star officer (the
Inspector) with a remit to inspect, study and survey throughout the RAF. The Inspector was expected to keep
in current flying practice as an aircraft captain on at least one Front Line aircraft type, and he routinely visited
RAF stations to fly as a member of the crew on other types of aircraft. During these visits, he would take time
to talk to personnel of all ranks. Through his visits, the inspections carried out by his staff, and by monitoring
all RAF occurrence reports, he was able to provide expert and well-informed advice to commanders. The IFS
also conducted Airworthiness Reviews of RAF aircraft; in this context, the IFS took a broad view of its remit
and included ‘fitness-for-purpose’ in addition to the technical airworthiness of the platform. The Fleet Air
Arm (FAA), and the Army Air Corps (AAC) had their own in-house airworthiness review arrangements.
Defence Aviation Safety Centre (2002)
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In 2002, the Defence Aviation Safety Centre (DASC) was formed and the IFS was folded into it. The change
was brought about because of the perceived need for a pan-Defence Flight Safety (FS) organisation to reflect
the growing proliferation of ‘purple’ or joint organisations in the MOD: e.g. Defence Logistics Organisation,
Joint Force Harrier, Joint Helicopter Command etc. The DASC was led by a 1-Star officer with a staff comprised
of officers from all three Services. It was considered to be a MOD level organisation, whose roles included
the formulation, regulation and validation of Defence aviation safety policy, providing FS advice upwards and
downwards throughout the Department and providing a single Departmental focus for FS issues. However,
the Director was not an ‘inspector’ and the DASC’s authority to audit and validate was limited to ‘one level
down’, i.e. not below Strike & Support Command HQs, Fleet HQ and HQ Directorate of Army Aviation
(DAAvn). This limitation appears to have stemmed from sensitivity in the Navy and Army that the DASC was
just a re-badged IFS(RAF) with, most likely, a light blue 1-Star. 43 Ironically, whilst the FAA and DAAvn managed
to retained their existing FS structures, the RAF, in a series of HQ rationalisations, ran-down its Command and
Group FS staffs, presumably in the mistaken view that the DASC would continue to fulfil the IFS(RAF) roles
(which it did not). 44
Advantage Report in December 2002 was critical
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In December 2002, a report by Advantage Technical Consulting identified and emphasised a series of
trenchant and perceptive criticisms of the safety and airworthiness regime across the acquisition cycle in the
MOD45 and concluded: “There is a pressing need to bring greater harmony and consistency to the assurance
42 Generic Aircraft Release Process.
43 Director DASC, and Director DARS, are competed posts; the incumbent should be the best man for the job, irrespective of his Service. However, the
size of the RAF in comparison to the FAA and Army Air Corps make it most likely that the Director would be ‘light blue’.
44 I understand that the resurrection of the IFS is currently being re-examined.
45 Advantage Technical Consulting, “Safety Process Review” Report dated 23 December 2002.