The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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Chapter 13 – Cuts, Change, Dilution and Distraction (1998-2006)
In my judgment, the lack of supervision was a problem of the system and changes in operation during this
period rather than something which is appropriately the subject of criticism of those in the delegation or
authority chain above. I say this for five reasons.
First, as emphasised above, the whole point and construct of IPTs was to make them ‘self-standing’ projectorientated
bodies led by strong IPTLs who would be ‘empowered’ to take all relevant decisions covering the
life of the platform. This was the model, and intent, of the fundamental shift brought about by the SDR,
i.e. to move from ‘functional-oriented’ to ‘project-orientated’ ways of military equipment acquisition and
management.
Second, the supervisory structure established within the DLO following the SDR reforms did not easily lend
itself to strong, functional engineering-led, hands-on supervision of air IPTs. George Baber received delegated
airworthiness authority directly from the 2-Star post DG ES(Air). DG ES(Air), however, had inherited a ‘flat’
management structure and sat above approximately 25 IPTs and could not, in practice, exercise personal
supervision or responsibility for 25 IPTLs, not least because of the extensive range of other roles and
responsibilities which DG ES(Air) was expected to carry out at the time. A new ‘cluster’ arrangement of IPTs
was introduced in 2004. However, as stated above, George Baber’s immediate line managers and reporting
officers were Air Commodores at 1-Star rank who, until 2005, had no engineering background. He initially
reported to a navigator (2002 to 2003), a supply officer (2004), a pilot (2004 to 2005) and only in 2005 did
he report to an engineer. The former could not realistically be expected to second-guess what steps he was
taking to manage airworthiness in his IPT.
Third, there were a number of audits carried out on the Nimrod IPT during this period which gave it a clean
bill of health. For instance, on 17 February 2004, a Preliminary Report on the Safety Audit of the Nimrod
IPT concluded that Nimrod IPT had developed a “comprehensive and robust (albeit probably expensive) SMS
[Safety Management System]”. In September 2005, an ASEMS Procedure audit evaluated the adequacy and
effectiveness of the safety and environmental management systems established by the IPTL and concluded
that “the majority of the IPT’s activities adequately address the requirements for safety and airworthiness”.
The audit highlighted the following “Areas of Strength” of the Nimrod IPT:
1. “The Nimrod Safety and Environmental Panel was working well, providing the IPT with good two way
communications and advice from stakeholders.
2. Data held on both the electronic Cassandra Hazard Log and Aircraft Data Configuration Tool was being
managed well.
3. Staff training records were accurate and up to date.
4. The IPT was represented on the Safety Manager’s Forum, a mechanism for Safety Managers from
various IPT’s to share experience and ideas.
5. The process for delegating appropriately was robust and thorough.
6. Particular praise goes to the BBMF Safety Manager who was managing the BBMF Safety Management
System extremely well.”
Fourth, there was nothing ostensibly which would have suggested all was not well with the Nimrod IPT.
Indeed, quite the opposite: for the most part the Nimrod IPT functioned well, particularly in delivering the
increasing Front Line capability required by the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts; and its IPTL, George Baber,
would have presented well on all fronts, particularly in the area of airworthiness process and regulation where
he had a growing reputation (his standard ‘competencies’ set was rolled out in the RAF). There would have
been little to alert the DG ES(Air) at the time or anyone in the ES(Air) Management Board that any lack of
care, priority and attention was being given by the Nimrod IPTL and Head of Air Vehicle in the Nimrod IPT to
the NSC. Regular reports were made to the FWAMG as to its progress: see, e.g. the report to the Thirteenth
FWAMG meeting on 13 June 2003, signed by George Baber, which stated “The CASSANDRA Hazard Log has
been populated by BAE Systems under Phase 1 work, Phase 2 of the task, scheduled for completion 31 Jan
04 will be to mitigate the hazards. QinetiQ has been appointed as the Independent Safety Assessor”.
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