The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

The Nimrod Review
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they had essentially been ‘going through the motions’ of producing rafts of recommendations which looked
impressive in the Reports but of which only a fraction would be actioned; and knowledge that the Customer
Acceptance Conference had probably successfully lowered the guard of Frank Walsh and the Nimrod IPT and
QinetiQ representatives present, and created a belief that not a lot of work remained to be done.
Frank Walsh could not have checked all the Pro-Formas
11.109 I reject Chris Lowe’s (frankly unreal and self-serving) suggestion that he expected Frank Walsh to have read and
checked all the Pro-Formas before signing off the NSC:
CHRIS LOWE: “... Frank would have a full set of everything. He would not sign anything
off without reading the evidence. I mean, I am sure that he would not sign off anything
without reviewing every ounce of evidence that was there.”
11.110 This would have been impossible. Not only did Frank Walsh not have access to the Pro-Formas save by physically
travelling to Chadderton and using the terminal there; but the task would have been beyond any one person. As
Frank Walsh pointed out, if he or the Nimrod IPT had been expected to check all of the Pro-Formas, they might
as well have done the NSC themselves without BAE Systems.
Suited everybody to sign-off
11.111 It is fair to point out, however, that it suited everybody at the Sixth PSWG for the NSC to be regarded as complete
and signed off without further delay or difficulty. The ‘high level of confidence’ in the Nimrod fleet was shared
around the table. The requirement to produce a Safety Case was a regulatory ‘box’ which was overdue under
BP1201 and needed to be ‘ticked’. Successful completion meant that publicity and prestige all-round for the
first major ‘equipment safety case’, especially for Chris Lowe and the IPTL, George Baber (and possibly a ‘pools
win’ for BAE Systems).
(17) BAE Systems’ analysis, assessment and categorisation of Hazard H73 was seriously
erroneous.
11.112 In my judgment, BAE Systems’ analysis, assessment and categorisation of Hazard H73 were seriously
erroneous.
BAE Systems personnel involved
11.113 The Mech Systems Hazard Response Pro-Forma for Hazard H73, relating to the catastrophic fire risk in No.
7 Tank Dry Bay Port and Starboard arising from the Cross-Feed/SCP duct (Zones 514/614), was drawn up by
Witness R [BAE Systems] who had been seconded from another part of BAE Systems to assist with the task of
completing the Pro-Formas. He completed his part of the Pro-Forma for Hazard H73 on 23 August 2004. An
Electrical Systems ‘Appendum’ was then added by Witness T [BAE Systems]. The final contents were approved
by Eric Prince on 30 August 2004.
Six errors
11.114 The Pro-Forma for Hazard H73 was manifestly erroneous in at least six respects:
(1) Despite expressly referring to certain relevant parts of the BCARs and AvP 970 in section 4, the Mech
Systems Pro-Forma failed to point out the serious breaches of those regulations inherent in the design
and/or to highlight the risk posed by an exposed ignition source.
(2) The Mech Systems Pro-Forma stated that the Cross-Feed duct “is only pressurised when the cross-feed
pipe is open, i.e. during engine start” (i.e. on the ground), and failed to take into account the lengthy
periods the cross-feed duct could be pressurised in the air (at a working temperature of up to 420°C)
when feeding the SCP or being used routinely to re-start engines shut down in flight.