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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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Chapter 10A – <strong>Nimrod</strong> Safety Case: <strong>The</strong> Facts (Phases 1 and 2)<br />

10A.195 Richard Oldfield’s PowerPoint presentation thus gave the clear indication that the task had been ‘completed’<br />

by BAE Systems. This, however, was manifestly not the case. As Witness A [BAE Systems] readily accepted<br />

in interview, with a large percentage of hazards left “Unclassified” by BAE Systems, the top-level goal could<br />

not be said to have been achieved and the impression given by Richard Oldfield’s presentation was wrong.<br />

Richard Oldfield’s presentation was, however, received without demur or comment by the unsuspecting<br />

<strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT and QinetiQ representatives present. As the minutes record: “<strong>The</strong>re were no comments or actions<br />

arising from this presentation”. Richard Oldfield was unable to give a satisfactory explanation as to why his<br />

presentation had said that the baseline reports were “complete” when, in fact, they were not complete,<br />

either in substance or even form. He was also unable to give a satisfactory explanation of what he knew at<br />

the time. He initially suggested in interview with the <strong>Review</strong> that it was his “understanding” at the time that<br />

the task was complete; but he was unable to say when he became aware that 40% of the hazards had been<br />

left open. <strong>The</strong> fact is that he was intimately involved managing all stages of the project and must have been<br />

fully aware of the true position. He admitted in interview that “we were obviously under pressure to actually<br />

meet the timescales.”<br />

Richard Oldfield’s Notes<br />

10A.196 Subsequent to Richard Oldfield’s first interview with the <strong>Review</strong>, some manuscript notes came to light which<br />

he had made shortly before the Customer Acceptance Conference on his copy of the draft of Annex B<br />

which formed part of Witness C [BAE Systems]’s PowerPoint presentation (see below) which showed he had<br />

calculated the precise numbers and percentages of hazards which remained “Unclassified”, namely 12 out of<br />

66 functional hazards (18%) and 22 out of 39 zonal hazards (56%), respectively. He therefore had a perfect<br />

grasp of the figures at the time and knew that a large proportion of the NSC work remained to be done.<br />

Chris Lowe’s presentation<br />

10A.197 <strong>The</strong> second presentation was a short PowerPoint presentation by Chris Lowe entitled “THE SAFETY CASE.<br />

WHAT IS IT?”. This was similar to previous presentations on the topic and explained the nature of a safety<br />

case and the advantages of the ‘top down’ approach to safety cases for legacy aircraft.<br />

Witness C [BAE Systems]’s presentation<br />

10A.198 <strong>The</strong> third presentation was a presentation by Witness C [BAE Systems]. This comprised a presentation on<br />

screen to the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT and QinetiQ of the CASSANDRA Hazard log ‘architecture’ and contents, and a<br />

demonstration of how CASSANDRA worked. <strong>The</strong> demonstration required those at the meeting to crowd<br />

round the single CASSANDRA computer terminal in another room. <strong>The</strong> screen presentation included screen<br />

shots of an ‘interacting systems hazard’ (Hazard H54), together with pdfs of the associated Pro-Formas. In<br />

the course of his presentation, Witness C [BAE Systems] also put up on the screen a table showing the ‘Post<br />

Mitigation Probability’ of Hazards H1 to H105. This was a draft of what was to become Annex B to the BLSC<br />

Reports. <strong>The</strong> table comprised four columns as follows:<br />

Hazard Ref Title Post Mitigation<br />

Probability<br />

Status<br />

H1 Environmental Hazard due to Adverse Weather<br />

Climate or Conditions<br />

Improbable Approved<br />

H2 Environmental Hazard due to Contaminated<br />

Runway<br />

Unclassified Approved<br />

H3<br />

etc.<br />

Environmental Hazard due to lightening strike Improbable Approved<br />

10A.199 It is clear from Witness K [BAE Systems] and Richard Oldfield’s notes that the table was shown at the meeting.<br />

It is also tolerably clear that most or all of the five pages of the table were put up on the screen including the<br />

later pages showing the zonal hazards (Hazard H44 onwards) because the minutes record a request being<br />

made by the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT representatives for a description of the zones to be included after each zone in<br />

CASSANDRA. 77 It would have been apparent from a careful look at the third and fourth pages of the table<br />

77 This was done in the final version of Annex B to the BLSC Reports.<br />

233

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