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The Nimrod Review - Official Documents

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Purpose of meeting<br />

11.77<br />

Dilemma<br />

11.78<br />

Chapter 11 – <strong>Nimrod</strong> Safety Case: Analysis and Criticisms<br />

<strong>The</strong> Customer Acceptance Conference at BAE Systems’ offices at Chadderton on 31 August and 1 September<br />

2004 represented the finale in the NSC process as far as BAE Systems was concerned. BAE Systems suggested<br />

in its submissions to the <strong>Review</strong> that the purpose of the Customer Acceptance Conference was simply to review<br />

and agree ‘the completion’ of the contract task and the existence of “Unclassified” or “Open” hazards did<br />

not affect this. This is not correct. <strong>The</strong> purpose of the meeting was, in fact, two-fold : (a) for BAE Systems to<br />

present “the results” of its NSC Phase 2 work; and (b) for BAE Systems to demonstrate “to the satisfaction of the<br />

<strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT Customer” that the contractual requirements of PDS Task 06-3409 had been satisfied, and to obtain<br />

agreement to ‘sign-off’ and final payment for the task. This is apparent from BAE Systems’ own minutes.<br />

It was initially envisaged that the Customer Acceptance Conference would comprise a detailed review of the<br />

Hazard Log contents, together with the other reports and the final BLSC reports. As the Customer Acceptance<br />

Conference approached, however, the key BAE Systems management personnel involved in the NSC, namely<br />

Chris Lowe, Richard Oldfield and Eric Prince, increasingly faced a dilemma. As each of them well knew (and as<br />

was clear to most of the BAE Systems staff involved in the NSC project): (i) work on all the hazards had been<br />

somewhat rushed and some had still not been completed (e.g. Hazards H78, H79 and H63); (ii) drafting of the<br />

BLSC Phase 2 Reports was not finished, in particular the Executive Summary, Conclusion and Annexes B and<br />

C thereof; (iii) over 30% of the hazards remained “Unclassified” and uncategorised, with no recommendation<br />

beyond “Further analytical techniques are required” before they could be classified; and (iv) over 40% of<br />

the hazards remained “Open” and unsentenced, many with no recommendation beyond “Further analytical<br />

techniques are required” before they could be sentenced and closed. In these circumstances, Chris Lowe, Richard<br />

Oldfield and Eric Prince must have been naturally concerned at the risk that the IPT and/or QinetiQ might be<br />

reluctant to agree to ‘sign off’ on PDS Task 06-3409 if they became aware of (i), (ii), (iii) and/or (iv).<br />

Switch in format<br />

11.79 In light of the above, as explained in Chapter 10A, there was a belated switch in the format of the meeting.<br />

Shortly before the Customer Acceptance Conference, a decision was taken within BAE Systems that the format<br />

of the Customer Acceptance Conference should be switched from a detailed review of the Hazard Log contents<br />

and the final BLSC reports to a ‘high level’ summary of BAE Systems’ Phase 2 work and a demonstration of<br />

Cassandra. <strong>The</strong> draft agenda discussed with Frank Walsh on 22 July envisaged the entire first day being spent<br />

on “Functions & Zonal Hazard Log”. <strong>The</strong> proposed agenda circulated with the call notice on 27 July included<br />

on the first day a “review” of the final BLSC Reports and on the second day a “full review” of the hazard log<br />

contents. <strong>The</strong> ‘Provisional Agenda’ circulated on 19 August, however, simply included a “<strong>Review</strong> of Hazards<br />

Log and Mitigation of Identified Hazards” on the first afternoon; to which was then added “...and Summary of<br />

Recommendations”. BAE Systems in evidence accepted that there was a change in the “intended emphasis” of<br />

the meeting but suggested that this decision was taken solely because it was thought there would be insufficient<br />

time to go through all the hazards in a two day meeting. I do not think this was the real, or only, reason. In my<br />

view, it suited BAE Systems’ purposes not to go into too much detail when presenting “the results” of its Phase<br />

2 work at the meeting in case the <strong>Nimrod</strong> IPT or QinetiQ asked too many awkward questions which might elicit<br />

facts such as (i), (ii), (iii) and/or (iv) discussed above.<br />

‘Rehearsal’ meeting<br />

11.80<br />

BAE Systems appear also to have held an internal ‘rehearsal’ meeting on or shortly before 31 August 2004, at<br />

which this revised format was given a run through. It is striking that no details or documents relating to it were<br />

forthcoming.<br />

281

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