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<strong>Child</strong> PornograPhy First report oF the Dutch NatioNal rapporteur
and means of connecting them to communication networks has also given rise to an expansion in the
number of ways in which child abuse material can be distributed and produced. 205
‘Distribution’ and ‘offering’
Commercial child pornography websites are generally set up and maintained by individual criminals and
criminal organisations. However, we cannot rule out that preferential offenders (see §1.4.2) also become
involved in the production and distribution of commercial child abuse material. This type of material accounts
for a relatively small proportion of the total supply of child abuse material on the Internet, 206 which
includes both so-called pay-to-view websites, where an individual may take out a subscription and is subsequently
able to view child abuse material for a certain period of time, and websites where an individual
may pay per file. 207 Commercial websites also face an economic problem, due to the fact that on the one
hand, the vendor must keep his/her wares concealed, but on the other hand also needs to advertise the
website. Once the blatant offering of material via websites became too risky, an alternative combination
then emerged in the form of the website-newsgroup, in which the website consisted of a portal featuring
advertisements and was backed up by a payment site. Advertising took place via the newsgroups in the form
of newsgroup messages. Subsequently, the website-spam combination was also observed. This involved a
similar type of website, however the advertising took place in the form of spam. 208 This immediately became
the ‘Achilles heel’ of the commercial circuit: providers must reveal their location, otherwise they would not
sell anything. A recent study by the European Financial Coalition concluded that the number of commercial
websites that offer child abuse material has declined drastically and that the profits are minimal. However,
various new payment systems and modi operandi have been observed. The rate of innovation within commercial
circuit is high and that manifests itself in the form of displacement effects on the Internet, as well as in
other ways. According to the <strong>National</strong> Threat Assessment [Nationaal Dreigingsbeeld (NDB)] from 2008, 209 there
205 See Verkrachting gehandicapte deels wél bij Cordaan [Rape of disabled (girl) did in fact partly take place at Cordaan],
Parool, 26 March 2011, available at: www.parool.nl/parool/nl/4048/AMSTERDAM-ZUIDOOST/article/detail/1865679/2011/03/26/Verkrachtiging-gehandicapte-deels-wel-bij-Cordaan.dhtml
(viewed 22
July 2011); Stiefvader kon het stiekem filmen van stiefdochter niet laten [Stepfather could not desist from secretly
filming stepdaughter], Noordhollands Dagblad, 3 February 2011, available at: www.noordhollandsdagblad.nl/nieuws/stadstreek/article6189391.ece/Stiefvader-kon-het-stiekem-filmen-van-stiefdochterniet-laten
(viewed 22 July 2011).
206 Mitchell et al., 2011; European Financial Coalition, 2010.
207 European Financial Coalition (2010, p.18) provides four possible reasons as to why individuals purchase
commercial child abuse material. Buyers may be inexperienced in seeking itand may not (yet) know
how/that child abuse material can be obtained for free; some buyers are habitual collectors and want
to be sure that they have complete series; buyers may believe that commercial websites provide greater
security from discovery by investigative authorities than p2p exchange programmes; or buyers hope to
receive new material from commercial websites.
208 Leukfeldt et al., 2009, p.26.
209 The <strong>National</strong> Threat Assessment (NDB) wrote that the decision was taken not to conduct any further
investigation into the production and distribution of child abuse material as the organised nature (as
far as the situation in the Netherlands is concerned) has been called into doubt. The NDB continued
that in 2008, no research data was available to provide an impression of the nature and extent of amateur
networks. It is a domain in which investigative authorities have difficulty in gaining an insight
(KLPD – International Police Information Service [Dienst IPOL], 2008, pp.19, 92).