2012. Ã©vi 2. szÃ¡m - Jura - PÃ©csi TudomÃ¡nyegyetem

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246 Helen Xanthaki: The UK Human Rights Act: a true excuse for judicial lawmaking by the aw Lords?although UK Supreme Court judges formulate a legalposition that is carried down to all inferior courts,that legal position can change rather easily when theissue is reconsidered by virtue of another case. So,one could argue that compared to the omnipotenceof the House of Lords before 1966, the possibility ofintroducing judge made law offered to the SupremeCourt is now rather diminished.However, even before 1998, UK judges enjoyeda level of discretion that seems disproportionate tothat allowed to their European civil law counterparts.Although the UK approach to the principle of theseparation of powers prevents judges from declaringan Act obsolete or unconstitutional, the principle isnot applied strictu sensu. In the past this allowed theLord Chancellor’s participation in all three functionsof the state.And more recently UK judges have been offeredunprecedented access to manipulation of nationallegislation as a means of squeezing it within thetelos and text of EU legislation [under Marleasing]and of the HRA 12 . But this new liberty should notbe viewed narrowly. It is a similar liberty, and onus,offered to the national judges of the member statesof the EU and of the states signatory to the ECHR. Itis not special to the HRA or indeed to UK judges. Itcan be attributed to the increasing demand placed tonational judiciaries for smooth, and therefore inherentlyflexible, approximation between national andregional/international instruments resulting fromlegal globalisation.ConclusionsSo, has the approach of the Law Lords to statutoryinterpretation been radically changed by theHuman Rights? Of course not. Suggesting that theimplementation of the HRA has changed the ethosof UK statutory interpretation would disregardthe continuing prevalence of the literal rule whenthe text is clear, the exceptional use of purposiveinterpretation when the text is unclear or its applicationuncertain, the extra-ordinary use of statutoryinterpretation as a concept, and the continuingprevalence of maxims and presumptions that delimitthe scope of any judicial activism made possibleby s.3 HRA.Do judges now see themselves as legislating humanrights through their interpretation of Acts ofParliament? Only an empirical analysis of all relevantjudgements could provide a conclusive answer tothat question. From a qualitative, and thereforeinherently subjective, point of view I think not. UKjudges simply enjoy, and suffer under, the obligationto marry national laws with EU legislation and theECHR as expressed by the HRA.But is this not a privilege worth offering to ourjudges? Would the alternative not condemn theUK legal system to the chaotic uncertainty of anuncontrolled and dangerous series of implied repealscaused by inconsistencies between previouslegislation and the HRA? And, after all, who wouldbe called upon to pronounce these express repealsother than the same UK judges that are now accusedof judicial law making?BibliographyKavanagh,”The Elusive Divide between Interpretationand Legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998” 24 [2004]OJLS, p. 259R. Graham, “A unified theory of statutory interpretation”23 [2002] Statute Law Review, p. 91, at 134.Sir Frederick Pollock, “Essays on Jurisprudence andEthics”, 1882Lord Reid, “The Judge as Law Maker” 12 [1972] Journalof the Society of Public Teachers of Law, p. 28G. MacCallum, “Legislative Intent” in R. Summers (ed),Essays in Legal Philosophy (1968, Blackwell, Oxford), p. 237,at 240.J. van Zyl Smit, “The New Purposive Interpretation ofStatutes:HRA Section 3 after Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza” 70(20 [2007] MLR, p. 294.F. Bennion, ‘A Human Rights Act Provision Now inForce’ 163 JP 164.P. Sales and B. Hooper,”Proportionality and the Formof Law” 119 [2003] LQR, p. 427.Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd [1978] ICR 347, at 354;Bulmer Ltd v. Bollinger [1974] Ch 401, at 425.R (McCann) v. Crown Court at Manchester [2003] 1 AC787, at §16-18.Learned Hand J in Cabell v. Markham (1945) 148 F 2d 737,at 739; Lord Bingham in R (Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State forHealth [2003] 2 AC 687, at §8; Lord Hoffmann in ICS v. WestBromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, at p.913; Wilsonv. First County Trust (No. 2), at §114-117.Magor and StMellons Rural District Council v Newport[1952] AC189, 191 per Lord Simonds.River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877) 2 AC 743, at763, per Lord Blackburn; R (Westminster CC) v. National AsylumService [2002] 1 WLR 2956, at §5, per Lord Steyn.See Editorial, “Legislative Intent”, Statute Law Review29(2), p. ii; Black-Clawson International Ltd v. PapierwerkeWaldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591, per Lord Reid; R v.Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions,ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349, at 395, per Lord Nicholls;Wilson v. First County Trust (No. 2) [2004] 1 AC 816, at§111, per Lord Hope.Rights BroughtHome, Cm3782 (1997) para 2.7Notes1A. Kavanagh,”The Elusive Divide between Interpretationand Legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998” 24[2004] OJLS, p. 259, at 279-282.2R. Graham, “A unified theory of statutory interpretation”23 [2002] Statute Law Review, p. 91, at 134.3Sir Frederick Pollock ‘Essays on Jurisprudence andEthics’, 1882, p. 85; Lord Reid, “The Judge as Law Maker” 12[1972] Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law, p. 28; Stockv. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd [1978] ICR 347, at 354; Bulmer Ltd v.Bollinger [1974] Ch 401, at 425.JURA 2012/2.
Helen Xanthaki: The UK Human Rights Act: a true excuse for judicial lawmaking by the aw Lords?2474R (McCann) v. Crown Court at Manchester [2003] 1 AC787, at §16-18.5G. MacCallum, “Legislative Intent” in R. Summers(ed), Essays in Legal Philosophy (1968, Blackwell, Oxford),p. 237, at 240.6Learned Hand J in Cabell v. Markham (1945) 148 F 2d 737,at 739; Lord Bingham in R (Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State forHealth [2003] 2 AC 687, at §8; Lord Hoffmann in ICS v. WestBromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, at p. 913; Wilsonv. First County Trust (No. 2), at §114-117.7For an individual case analysis see Jan van Zyl Smit,“The New Purposive Interpretation of Statutes: HRA Section 3after Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza” 70 (20 [2007] MLR, p. 294.8Bennion, ’A Human Rights Act Provision Now in Force’163 JP 164.9Magor and StMellons Rural District Council v Newport[1952] AC189, 191 per Lord Simonds.10River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877) 2 AC 743, at763, per Lord Blackburn; R (Westminster CC) v. National AsylumService [2002] 1 WLR 2956, at §5, per Lord Steyn.11See Editorial, “Legislative Intent”, Statute Law Review29(2), p. ii; Black-Clawson International Ltd v. PapierwerkeWaldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591, per Lord Reid; R v.Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions,ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349, at 395, per Lord Nicholls;Wilson v. First County Trust (No. 2) [2004] 1 AC 816, at§111, per Lord Hope.12Rights BroughtHome, Cm3782 (1997) para 2.7; P. Salesand B. Hooper, ”Proportionality and the Form of Law” 119[2003] LQR, p. 427.JURA 2012/2.
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J U R AA Pécsi Tudományegyetem Á
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TartalomTARTALOMSTUDIUMANDRÁSSY GY
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ContentsCONTENTSSTUDIUMGYÖRGY ANDR
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Andrássy György: Emberi jogok és
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Ádám Antal: Etikáról, erkölcsr
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Bencsik András: A versenyjog szere
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Bruhács János: Argentína és Uru
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Chronowski Nóra: Az alkotmányozá
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Drinóczi Tímea: Alkotmányos pár
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Ercsey Zsombor: Az általános forg
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Eszteri Dániel: Bitcoin: Az anarch
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94 Eszteri Dániel: Bitcoin: Az ana
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100 Eszteri Dániel: Bitcoin: Az an
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102 Hadi Nikolett: A fogyatékossá
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112 Máté Julesz: Civil Society an
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118 Király Lilla: A keresetjog elm
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138 Andityas Soares de Moura Costa
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148 Papp Attila: Uzsorabíróságok
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160 Polyák Gábor: A pluralizmus m
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178 André Ramos Tavares: The case
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186JURA 2012/2.
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188 Bérces Viktor: A védőügyvé
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Page 196 and 197: 196 Bérces Viktor: A védőügyvé
Page 198 and 199: 198 Bertaldó András: A sztrájksz
Page 206 and 207: 206 Bónis Péter: A pacta sunt ser
Page 212 and 213: 212 Dobos István: Közteherviselé
Page 220 and 221: 220 Ulrich Karpen: Migration and Hu
Page 226 and 227: 226 Kiss Mónika Dorota: A helyi n
Page 240 and 241: 240 Jorn van Rij: A Dutch Invitatio
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Page 244 and 245: 244 Helen Xanthaki: The UK Human Ri
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Page 250 and 251: 250 Mirela Župan: Conclusion on co
Page 252 and 253: 252 Mirela Župan: Conclusion on co
Page 254 and 255: 254 Berke Gyula: Tanévnyitó dék
Page 256 and 257: 256 Cseh Balázs: „Pohánka Éva
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Page 260 and 261: 260 Kocsis Patrícia: Werner Ogris
Page 262 and 263: 262 Kocsis Tímea: A Dévai Szent F
Page 264 and 265: 264 Kocsis Tímea: A Dévai Szent F
Page 266 and 267: 266 Vogl Márk: “Shaping language
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Page 270 and 271: 270 A JURA korábbi számainak tart
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2012. Ã©vi 2. szÃ¡m - Jura - PÃ©csi TudomÃ¡nyegyetem

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