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University of Vaasa - Vaasan yliopisto

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707<br />

In Germany the “green” issues have dominated political debates since 1970s.<br />

Companies were always targeted by a NGO’s environmental campaign. However the<br />

environmental movements in Germany were interestingly not connected with CSR.<br />

Not only German companies but also NGOs ignored CSR debates (Habisch and<br />

Wegner 2004). Honestly I do not know why NGOs did not take notice <strong>of</strong> CSR in<br />

Germany, but imagine the German political institution hampered the development <strong>of</strong><br />

information disclosure, thus NGOs did not sufficiently trust companies as a<br />

cooperative partners. Unlike the Japanese situation, the German government is<br />

relative independent from industries. The Federation <strong>of</strong> German Industry (BDI) is a<br />

strong player who is actively lobbying in the German politics, but the opportunity <strong>of</strong><br />

lobbying is relatively open for all actors. Thus NGOs are very active in Germany.<br />

Their participation to German environmental policy has been already since 1980s<br />

institutionalised. In fact, NGOs are in many questionnaires ranked as the second<br />

important player with about 5 million participants. According to that, ‘Greenpeace’<br />

got the third place <strong>of</strong> important institutions, following the German government and<br />

the EU commission (Jänicke, Kunig, and Stitzel 2002). An important notion is that<br />

the relationship between companies and NGOs was hostile due to a stiff competition<br />

in lobbying. The BDI responded hostilely to every environmental movement and<br />

tried to water down environmental laws. German companies did not disclose<br />

information. I think they tried to avoid interference in their management strategies<br />

from NGOs through closing information. The cost <strong>of</strong> politicisation <strong>of</strong> a target issue<br />

was sometimes expensive for NGOs due to the small availability to information <strong>of</strong> a<br />

company which they wanted to target.<br />

At last both Japan and Germany argue that they have a long tradition <strong>of</strong> “Corporate<br />

Citizenship”. Corporate Citizenship is connected with philanthropy and social<br />

donation in Germany respectively. Since Japan imported CSR from USA, it is sure<br />

that philanthropy has a strong influence on Japan’s CSR. In 1970s it was a boom<br />

with in Japanese companies to establish a foundation in order to donate local<br />

communities. A peak <strong>of</strong> this was establishment <strong>of</strong> 1% Club by the Federation <strong>of</strong><br />

Economic Organizations (Nippon Keindaren: Keidanren) 8 . Related to environmental<br />

activities companies promoted protection <strong>of</strong> local environment, using their<br />

employees. Waste-pick-up is a typical example <strong>of</strong> this. However the EU estimates<br />

philanthropy as “not bad but not enough” activities (Fujii 2005). Typical examples <strong>of</strong><br />

German corporate citizenship include donation to a local sport club or environmental<br />

organisations. In fact corporate citizenship is a subset <strong>of</strong> CSR however this must be<br />

differentiated from CSR. Corporate Citizenship is persistently voluntary restoration<br />

<strong>of</strong> their benefits, which does not need use <strong>of</strong> corporate competitiveness.<br />

Interim Conclusion<br />

Until 1990s the relationship between companies and government was in Japan very<br />

close and in Germany relatively neutral respectively and that <strong>of</strong> companies and<br />

NGOs was in Japan as weak as being likely not to exist and hostile in Germany. How<br />

can this be understood? An important influential resource <strong>of</strong> a regulator is the<br />

regulatory threat (Alberini and Segerson 2002; Lyon and Maxwell 2008; Segerson<br />

8 Keidanren required the participants <strong>of</strong> 1% club to make a donation <strong>of</strong> 1% <strong>of</strong> their sales to local communities.

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